Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in
Book cover

New Issues and Paradigms in Research on Social Dilemmas pp 27–42Cite as

A Classification of Games by Player Type

  • Chapter

In this chapter, I lay out a classification of social situations—situations of interdependent decision making—based on the type of decision makers involved. Then, using this framework, I review the decision-making literature and point out the gaps that still exist in it. The classification of social situations, or games, builds on a distinction between three basic types of decision-making agents, or players: individuals, cooperative or unitary groups—groups whose members can reach a binding (and costless) agreement on a joint strategy—and non-cooperative groups— groups whose members act independently without being able to make a binding agreement. Pitting individuals (I), unitary groups (U), and non-cooperative groups (G) against one another, and adding nature as a potential “opponent,” generates the 3 (type of agent) × 4 (type of opponent) matrix depicted in Table 3.1.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution.

Chapter
USD   29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD   39.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD   54.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info
Hardcover Book
USD   54.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Learn about institutional subscriptions

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

References

  • Amaldoss, W., Meyer, R., Raju, J., Rapoport, A. (2000). Collaborating to compete. Marketing Science, 19, 105–126.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Axelrod, R. (1984). The Evolution of Cooperation. New York: Basic Books.

    Google Scholar 

  • Baron, J. (1997). The illusion of morality as self-interest: A reason to cooperate in social dilemmas. Psychological Science, 8, 330–335.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Baron, J. (2001). Confusion of group-interest and self-interest in parochial cooperation on behalf of the group. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 45, 283–296.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Berg, J., Dickhaut, J., McCabe, K. (1995). Trust, reciprocity, and social history. Games and Economic Behavior, 10, 21–142.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Blinder, A. S., Morgan, J. (2005). Are two heads better than one? An experimental analysis of group vs. individual decision making, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 37, 789–811.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Bornstein, G. (1992). The free rider problem in intergroup conflicts over step-level and continuous public goods. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 62, 597–606.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Bornstein, G. (2003). Intergroup conflict: Individual, group, and collective interests. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 7, 129–145.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Bornstein, G., Ben-Yossef, M. (1994). Cooperation in intergroup and single-group social dilemmas. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 30, 52–67.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Bornstein, G., Erev, I. (1994). The enhancing effect of intergroup competition on group performance. International Journal of Conflict Management, 5, 271–284.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Bornstein, G., Yaniv, I. (1998). Individual and group behavior in the ultimatum game: Are groups more “rational” players? Experimental Economics, 1, 101–108.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bornstein, G., Budescu, D., Zamir, S. (1997). Cooperation in intergroup, two-person, and n-person games of Chicken. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 41, 384–406.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Bornstein, G., Budescu, D., Kugler, T., Selten, R. (in press). Repeated price competition between individuals and between teams. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bornstein, G., Gneezy, U., Nagel, R. (2002). The effect of intergroup competition on intragroup coordination: An experimental study. Games and Economic Behavior.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bornstein, G., Rapoport, A., Kerpel, L., Katz, T. (1989). Within and between group communication in intergroup competition for public goods. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 25, 422–436.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Bornstein, G., Schram, A., Sonnemans, J. (2004). Do democracies breed chickens? Forthcoming in R. Suleiman, D. V. Budescu, I. Fischer & D. Messick (eds.), Contemporary Psychological Research on Social Dilemmas. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Brams, S. (1975). Game Theory and Politics: International Relations Games. New York: The Free Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Brewer, M. B., Kramer, R. M. (1986). Choice behavior in social dilemmas: Effects of social identity, group size, and decision framing. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 50, 543–549.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Budescu, D. V, Rapoport, A., Suleiman, R. (1990). Resource dilemmas with environmental uncertainty and asymmetric players. European Journal of Social Psychology, 20, 475–478.

    Google Scholar 

  • Camerer, C. (1995). Individual decision making. In A. Roth & J. Kagel (eds.), Handbook of Experimental Economics. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Campbell, D. T. (1965). Ethnocentric and other altruistic motives. In D. Levine (ed.), Nebraska Symposium on Motivation. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Campbell, D. T. (1972). On the genetics of altruism and the counter-hedonic components in human culture. Journal of Social Issues, 28, 21–37.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Cason, T. N., Mui, V. (1997). A laboratory study of group polarization in the team dictator game. Economic Journal, 107, 1465–1483.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Chamberlin, E. (1929). Duopoly: Values where sellers are few. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 43, 63–100.

    Google Scholar 

  • Coleman, J. (1990). Foundations of Social Theory. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Colman, A. M. (1995). Game Theory and Its Applications. Oxford: Butterworth-Heinemann.

    Google Scholar 

  • Conradt, L., Roper, T. J. (2003). Group decision-making in animals. Nature, 42, 155–158.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Cooper, D. J., Kagel, J. H. (2005). Are two heads better than one? Team versus individual play in signaling games. American Economic Review, 95, 477–509.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Cooper, R. (1999). Coordination Games: Complementarities and Macroeconomics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Coser, L. A. (1956). The Function of Social Conflict. Glencoe, IL: Free Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Cox, J. C. (2002). Trust, reciprocity, and other-regarding preferences: Groups vs. individuals and males vs. females. In R. Zwick & A. Rapoport (eds.), Advances in Experimental Business Research. New York: Kluwer Academic Publishers.

    Google Scholar 

  • Davis, J. H. (1992). Some compelling intuitions about group consensus decisions: Theoretical and empirical research, and interpersonal aggregation phenomena: Selected examples, 1950–1990, Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 52, 3–38.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Dawes, R. M. (1980). Social dilemmas. Annual Review of Psychology, 31, 169–193.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Dawes, R. M., Messick, D. M. (2000). Social dilemmas. International Journal of Psychology, 35, 111–116.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Deutsch, M. (1973). The Resolution of Conflict. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Elbittar, A., Gomberg, A., Sour, L. (2004). Group decision-making in ultimatum bargaining: An experimental study. Unpublished manuscript.

    Google Scholar 

  • Erev, I., Bornstein, G., Galili, R. (1993). Constructive intergroup competition as a solution to the free rider problem: A field experiment. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 29, 463–478.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Gunnthorsdottir, A., Rapoport, A. (2006). Egalitarian vs. proportional profit-sharing rules in multi-level collective action problems. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 101, 184–199.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hardin, R. (1982). Collective Action. Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hardin, R. (1995). One for All: The Logic of Intergroup Conflict. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hastie, R., Kameda, T. (2005). The robust beauty of majority rules in group decisions. Psychological Review, 112, 494–508.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Heinsohn, R. (1997). Group territoriality in two populations of African lions. Animal Behavior, 53, 1143–1147.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hill, G. W. (1982). Group versus individual performance: Are n + 1 heads better than one? Psychological Bulletin, 91, 517–539.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Insko, C. A., Schopler, J. (1987). Categorization, competition, and collectivity, in C. Hendrick, (ed.), Group Processes (Vol. 8, pp. 213–251). New York: Sage.

    Google Scholar 

  • Isaac, R. M., Walker, J. M. (1994). Group size and the voluntary provision of public goods: Experimental evidence utilizing large groups. Journal of Public Economics, 54, 1–36.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Jervis, R. (1978). Cooperation under the security dilemma. World Politics, 30, 167–186.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kahneman, D., Knetsch, J., Thaler, R. (1986). Fairness as a constraint on profit seeking: Entitlements in the market. American Economic Review, 76, 728–741.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kahneman, D., Slovic, P., Tversky, A. (eds.) (1982). Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kelley, H. H., Thibaut, J. W. (1978). Interpersonal Relations: A Theory of Interdependence. New York: Wiley.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kerr, L. N., MacCoun, R. J., Kramer, G. P. (1996). Bias in judgment: Comparing individuals and groups. Psychological Review, 103, 687–719.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kocher, M. G., Sutter, M. (2005). The decision maker matters: Individual versus group behavior in experimental beauty-contest games. The Economic Journal, 115, 200–223.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kocher, M. G., Sutter, M. (in press). Individual versus group behavior and the role of the decision making procedure in gift-exchange experiments. Empirica.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kollock, P. (1998). Social dilemmas: The anatomy of cooperation. Annual Review of Sociology, 24, 183–214.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Komorita, S., Parks, C. (1995). Interpersonal relations: Mixed-motive interaction. Annual Review of Psychology, 46, 183–207.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kramer, R. M., Brewer, M. B. (1984). Effects of group identity on resource use in simulated social dilemmas. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 46, 1044–1057.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kugler, T., Bornstein, G. (2005). Individual and groups as players in bilateral conflicts. Unpublished manuscript.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kugler, T., Bornstein, G., Kocher, M. G., Sutter, M. (in press). A trust game between individuals and groups: Groups are less trusting than individuals but just as trustworthy. Journal of Economic Psychology.

    Google Scholar 

  • Ledyard, J. O. (1995). Public goods: A survey of experimental research. In A. Roth & J. Kagel (eds.), Handbook of Experimental Economics. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Levine, R., Campbell, D. (1972). Ethnocentrism: Theories of Conflict, Ethnic Attitudes and Group Behavior. New York: John Wiley.

    Google Scholar 

  • McKelvey, R., Palfrey, T. (1992). An experimental study of the centipede game. Econometrica, 60, 803–836.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Messick, D. M., Allison, S. T., Samuelson, C. D. (1988). Framing and communication effects on group members’ responses to environmental and social uncertainty. In S. Maital (ed.), Applied Behavioral Economics (Vol. 2, pp. 677–700). New York: New York University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Nalbantian, H., Schotter, A. (1997). Productivity under group incentives: An experimental study. American Economic Review, 87, 314–341.

    Google Scholar 

  • Palfrey, T., Rosenthal, H. (1983). A strategic calculus of voting. Public Choice, 41, 7–53.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Pallais, A. (2005). The effect of group size on ultimatum bargaining. Unpublished manuscript.

    Google Scholar 

  • Probst, T., Carnevale, P., Triandis, H. (1999). Cultural values in intergroup and single-group social dilemmas. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 77, 171–191.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Putnam, R. D. (1988). Diplomacy and domestic politics: The logic of two-level games. International Organization, 42, 427–460.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Rabbie, J. M. (1982). The effects of intergroup competition on intragroup and intergroup relationships. In V. J. Derlega & J. Grzelak (eds.), Cooperation and Helping Behavior: Theories and Research. New York: Academic Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Rapoport, A., Amaldoss, W. (1999). Social dilemmas embedded in between-group competitions: Effects of contest and distribution rules. In M. Foddy, M. Smithson, S. Schneider, & M. Hogg (eds.), Resolving Social Dilemmas: Dynamic, Structural, and Intergroup Aspects. Philadelphia: Psychology Press, Taylor & Francis.

    Google Scholar 

  • Rapoport, A., Bornstein, G. (1987). Intergroup competition for the provision of binary public goods. Psychological Review, 94, 291–299.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Rapoport, A., Bornstein, G. (1989). Solving public goods problems in competition between equal and unequal size groups. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 33, 460–479.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Rapoport, A., Bornstein, G., Erev, I. (1989). Intergroup competition for public goods: Effects of unequal resources and relative group size. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 56, 748–756.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Robert, C., Carnevale, P. J. (1997). Group choice in ultimatum bargaining. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 72, 256–279.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Schopler, J., Insko, C. A. (1992). The discontinuity effect in interpersonal and intergroup relations: Generality and mediation. In W. Strobe & M. Hewstone (eds.), European Review of Social Psychology. Chichester, UK: John Wiley.

    Google Scholar 

  • Sherif, M. (1966). In Common Predicament: Social Psychology of Intergroup Conflict and Cooperation. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.

    Google Scholar 

  • Snidal, D. (1986). The game theory of international politics. In K. Oye (ed.), Cooperation Under Anarchy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Stein, A. A. (1976). Conflict and cohesion: A review of the literature. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 20, 143–172.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Suleiman, R. (1997). Provision of step-level public goods under uncertainty: A theoretical analysis. Rationality and Society, 9, 163–187.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Sutter, M. (2005). Are four heads better than two? An experimental beauty-contest game with teams of different size. Economics Letters, 88, 41–46.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Tajfel, H. (1982). Social psychology of intergroup relations. Annual Review of Psychology, 33, 1–39.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Tajfel, H., Turner, J. C. (1979). An integrative theory of intergroup conflict. In W. G. Austin & S. Worchel (eds.), The Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations. Monterey, CA: Brooks/Cole.

    Google Scholar 

  • Takacs, K. (2001). Structural embeddedness and intergroup conflict. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 45, 743–769.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Tirole, J. (1988). The Theory of Industrial Organization. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Turner, J. C. (1975). Social comparison and social identity: Some prospects for intergroup behavior. European Journal of Social Psychology, 5, 5–34.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Turner, J. C., Brown, R. J., Tajfel, H. (1979). Social comparison and group interest in intergroup favoritism. European Journal of Social Psychology, 9, 187–204.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Van Huyck, J., Battalio, R., Beil, R. (1990). Tacit coordination games, strategic uncertainty, and coordination failure. American Economic Review, 80, 234–248.

    Google Scholar 

  • Velicer, G. (2003). Social strife in the microbial world. Trends in Microbiology, 11, 330–337.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Wildschut, T., Pinter, B., Vevea, J. L., Insko, C. A., Schopler, J. (2003). Beyond the group mind: A quantitative review of the interindividual–intergroup discontinuity effect. Psychological Bulletin, 129, 698–722.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Wilson, M. L., Hauser, M. D., Wrangham, R. W. (2001). Does participation in intergroup conflict depend on numerical assessment, range location, or rank for wild chimpanzees? Animal Behavior, 61, 1203–1216.

    Article  Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Jerusalem, Israel

    Gary Bornstein

Authors
  1. Gary Bornstein
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Göteborg University, Göteborg, Sweden

    Anders Biel , Daniel Eek , Tommy Gärling  & Mathias Gustafsson , ,  & 

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2008 Springer Science+Business Media, LLC

About this chapter

Cite this chapter

Bornstein, G. (2008). A Classification of Games by Player Type. In: Biel, A., Eek, D., Gärling, T., Gustafsson, M. (eds) New Issues and Paradigms in Research on Social Dilemmas. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-387-72596-3_3

Download citation

Publish with us

Policies and ethics

Search

Navigation