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An Identification Scheme Provably Secure against Reset Attack

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Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNCS,volume 2229))

Abstract

We develop an efficient identification scheme based on Cramer-Shoup test function. The scheme is provably secure against reset attack under post-processing model provided the hardness assumption of the decisional Diffie-Hellman problem as well as the existence of collision free hash functions.

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References

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© 2001 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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Lee, CH., Deng, X., Zhu, H. (2001). An Identification Scheme Provably Secure against Reset Attack. In: Qing, S., Okamoto, T., Zhou, J. (eds) Information and Communications Security. ICICS 2001. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 2229. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-45600-7_31

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-45600-7_31

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-42880-0

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-45600-1

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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