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Theory and Applications of Relational Structures as Knowledge Instruments II pp 1–30Cite as

Social Software for Coalition Formation

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Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNAI,volume 4342))

Abstract

This paper concerns an interdisciplinary approach to coalition formation. We apply the MacBeth software, relational algebra, the RelView tool, graph theory, bargaining theory, social choice theory, and consensus reaching to a model of coalition formation. A feasible government is a pair consisting of a coalition of parties and a policy supported by this coalition. A feasible government is stable if it is not dominated by any other feasible government. Each party evaluates each government with respect to certain criteria. MacBeth helps to quantify the importance of the criteria and the attractiveness and repulsiveness of governments to parties with respect to the given criteria. Feasibility, dominance, and stability are formulated in relation-algebraic terms. The RelView tool is used to compute the dominance relation and the set of all stable governments. In case there is no stable government, i.e., in case the dominance relation is cyclic, we apply graph-theoretical techniques for breaking the cycles. If the solution is not unique, we select the final government by applying bargaining or appropriate social choice rules. We describe how a coalition may form a government by reaching consensus about a policy.

Co-operation for this paper was supported by European COST Action 274 “Theory and Applications of Relational Structures as Knowledge Instruments” (TARSKI). We thank Gunther Schmidt for his most valuable contributions to this paper.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Nijmegen School of Management, Radboud University Nijmegen, P.O. Box 9108, 6500, HK, Nijmegen, The Netherlands

    Agnieszka Rusinowska

  2. Department of Mathematical Economics, Warsaw School of Economics, Al. Niepodleglosci 162, 02-554, Warsaw, Poland

    Agnieszka Rusinowska

  3. Institute of Computer Science, University of Kiel, Olshausenstraße 40, 24098, Kiel, Germany

    Rudolf Berghammer

  4. Department of Computing Science, Umeå University, SE-90187, Umeå, Sweden

    Patrik Eklund

  5. Faculty of Philosophy, University of Groningen, Oude Boteringestraat 52, 9712, GL, Groningen, The Netherlands

    Jan-Willem van der Rijt

  6. Institute of Mathematics, B37, University of Liège, B-4000, Liège, Belgium

    Marc Roubens

  7. Faculté Polytechnique de Mons, Rue de Houdain 9, B-7000, Mons, Belgium

    Marc Roubens

  8. Faculty of Philosophy, Tilburg University, P.O. Box 90153, 5000, LE Tilburg, The Netherlands

    Harrie de Swart

Authors
  1. Agnieszka Rusinowska
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  2. Rudolf Berghammer
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  3. Patrik Eklund
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  4. Jan-Willem van der Rijt
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  5. Marc Roubens
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  6. Harrie de Swart
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Faculty of Philosophy, Tilburg University, P.O. Box 90153, 5000, Tilburg, LE, The Netherlands

    Harrie de Swart

  2. National Institute of Telecommunications, Warsaw,  

    Ewa Orłowska

  3. Institute for Software Technology, Department of Computing Science, Universität der Bundeswehr München, 85577, Neubiberg, Germany

    Gunther Schmidt

  4. Faculté Polytechnique de Mons, Rue de Houdain 9, B-7000, Mons, Belgium

    Marc Roubens

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Rusinowska, A., Berghammer, R., Eklund, P., van der Rijt, JW., Roubens, M., de Swart, H. (2006). Social Software for Coalition Formation. In: de Swart, H., Orłowska, E., Schmidt, G., Roubens, M. (eds) Theory and Applications of Relational Structures as Knowledge Instruments II. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 4342. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/11964810_1

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/11964810_1

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-69223-2

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-69224-9

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