Abstract
The standard symbolic, deducibility-based notions of secrecy are in general insufficient from a cryptographic point of view, especially in presence of hash functions. In this paper we devise and motivate a more appropriate secrecy criterion which exactly captures a standard cryptographic notion of secrecy for protocols involving public-key enryption and hash functions: protocols that satisfy it are computationally secure while any violation of our criterion directly leads to an attack. Furthermore, we prove that our criterion is decidable via an NP decision procedure. Our results hold for standard security notions for encryption and hash functions modeled as random oracles.
Work partly supported by ACI Jeunes Chercheurs JC9005 and ARA SSIA Formacrypt.
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Cortier, V., Kremer, S., Küsters, R., Warinschi, B. (2006). Computationally Sound Symbolic Secrecy in the Presence of Hash Functions. In: Arun-Kumar, S., Garg, N. (eds) FSTTCS 2006: Foundations of Software Technology and Theoretical Computer Science. FSTTCS 2006. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 4337. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/11944836_18
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/11944836_18
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