Abstract
We derive a polynomial time algorithm to compute a stable solution in a mixed matching market from an auction procedure as presented by Eriksson and Karlander [5]. As a special case we derive an \(\mathcal{O}(nm)\) algorithm for bipartite matching that does not seem to have appeared in the literature yet.
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Hochstättler, W., Jin, H., Nickel, R. (2006). Note on an Auction Procedure for a Matching Game in Polynomial Time. In: Cheng, SW., Poon, C.K. (eds) Algorithmic Aspects in Information and Management. AAIM 2006. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 4041. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/11775096_36
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/11775096_36
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