Abstract
We describe a cryptographically sound formal logic for proving protocol security properties without explicitly reasoning about probability, asymptotic complexity, or the actions of a malicious attacker. The approach rests on a new probabilistic, polynomial-time semantics for an existing protocol security logic, replacing an earlier semantics that uses nondeterministic symbolic evaluation. While the basic form of the protocol logic remains unchanged from previous work, there are some interesting technical problems involving the difference between efficiently recognizing and efficiently producing a value, and involving a reinterpretation of standard logical connectives that seems necessary to support certain forms of reasoning.
This work was partially supported by NSF CyberTrust Grant 0430594, Collaborative research: High-fidelity methods for security protocols, by the DoD University Research Initiative (URI) program administered by the Office of Naval Research under Grant N00014-01-1-0795, by OSD/ONR CIP/SW URI through ONR Grant N00014-04-1-0725, by NSF CCR-0121403, Computational Logic Tools for Research and Education, and by the NSF Cybertrust grant to the PORTIA project. M. Turuani’s activities at Stanford were also funded by a postdoctoral grant from INRIA.
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Datta, A., Derek, A., Mitchell, J.C., Shmatikov, V., Turuani, M. (2005). Probabilistic Polynomial-Time Semantics for a Protocol Security Logic. In: Caires, L., Italiano, G.F., Monteiro, L., Palamidessi, C., Yung, M. (eds) Automata, Languages and Programming. ICALP 2005. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 3580. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/11523468_2
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