Regulation and Instability in U.S. Commercial Banking

1. Front Matter

   Pages i-xvi

   PDF

2. Commercial Bank Instability

   • Jill M. Hendrickson

   Pages 1-9

3. Theories of Bank Regulation

   • Jill M. Hendrickson

   Pages 10-20

4. Antebellum Banking: 1781–1863

   • Jill M. Hendrickson

   Pages 21-73

5. National Banking Era: 1864–1912

   • Jill M. Hendrickson

   Pages 74-114

6. Era of Instability and Change: 1913–1944

   • Jill M. Hendrickson

   Pages 115-163

7. Postwar Banking Era and Regulatory Response: 1945–1999

   • Jill M. Hendrickson

   Pages 164-204

8. Banking and Crisis in the Twenty-First Century: 2000–2010

   • Jill M. Hendrickson

   Pages 205-230

9. Lessons from the History of U.S. Banking and Regulation

   • Jill M. Hendrickson

   Pages 231-247

10. Back Matter

    Pages 248-296

    PDF

The historical response to bank crises has always been more regulation. A pattern emerges that some may find surprising: regulation often contributes to bank instability. It suppresses competition and effective response to market changes and encourages bankers to take on additional risk. This book offers a valuable history lesson for policy makers.

• bank
• banking
• competition
• crisis
• Policy

• University of St Thomas, USA

  Jill M. Hendrickson

JILL M. HENDRICKSON Visiting Associate Professor at the University of St. Thomas, USA. Previously, she held the Frank Wilson Endowed Chair of Political Economy at the University of the South, USA. She has published her research on banking regulation in The Journal of Economic History, and The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, among other journals.

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