About this book
- Book Title The Nature of Scientific Thinking
- Book Subtitle On Interpretation, Explanation, and Understanding
- DOI https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137389831
- Copyright Information Jan Faye 2014
- Publisher Name Palgrave Macmillan, London
- eBook Packages Palgrave Religion & Philosophy Collection Philosophy and Religion (R0)
- Hardcover ISBN 978-1-137-38982-4
- Softcover ISBN 978-1-349-99993-4
- eBook ISBN 978-1-137-38983-1
- Edition Number 1
- Number of Pages XIV, 333
- Number of Illustrations 0 b/w illustrations, 0 illustrations in colour
Philosophy of Science
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“The Nature of Scientific Thinking provides a valuable resource both for those who share his basic strategy–who will find many topics to take up–and for those who do not–who will be able to identify where disagreement stems from. … provides a stimulating framework for thinking about these questions. It should be of interest both to those who tackle questions related to explanation from pragmatic approaches and to those working within formal-logical or ontic approaches.” (Lina Jansson, International Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. 29 (2), 2015)
In sum, The Nature of Scientific Thinking offers a wide-ranging perspective on the natural sciences. Faye presents his views in discussion with existing accounts of explanation, understanding, representation and interpretation, and illustrates his theses with many detailed examples from a variety of disciplines.
-Henk W. de Regt, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews
The book is very readable and informative and contains stimulating ideas. But the most valuable aspect is the convincing way in which the author argues in favour of a contextual-rhetorical approach to explanation.
-Xavier de Donato Rodríguez, Metascience
There is much to praise in Faye's book, especially his facility with examples from various sciences, including physics, biology, and zoology. He masterfully keeps within the parameters of his argument regarding scientific explanation without expanding his range too widely.
-Mark Tschaepe, Philosophy in Review