Aristotle and Augustine on Freedom

Two Theories of Freedom, Voluntary Action and Akrasia

  • T. D. J. Chappell

Table of contents

  1. Front Matter
    Pages i-xii
  2. Aristotle

    1. Front Matter
      Pages 1-1
    2. T. D. J. Chappell
      Pages 3-31
    3. T. D. J. Chappell
      Pages 32-54
    4. T. D. J. Chappell
      Pages 55-87
    5. T. D. J. Chappell
      Pages 88-118
  3. Augustine

    1. Front Matter
      Pages 119-119
    2. T. D. J. Chappell
      Pages 121-139
    3. T. D. J. Chappell
      Pages 140-153
    4. T. D. J. Chappell
      Pages 154-175
    5. T. D. J. Chappell
      Pages 176-207
  4. Back Matter
    Pages 208-213

About this book


Aristotle and Augustine both hold that our beliefs in freedom and voluntary action are interdependent, and that voluntary actions can only be done for the sake of good. Hence Aristotle holds that no-one acts voluntarily in pursuit of evil: such actions would be inexplicable. Augustine, agreeing that such actions are inexplicable, still insists that they occur. This is the true place in Augustine's view of his 'theory of will' - and the real point of contrast between Aristotle and Augustine.


Aristotle freedom knowledge liberty reason

Authors and affiliations

  • T. D. J. Chappell
    • 1
  1. 1.University of East AngliaUK

Bibliographic information

  • DOI
  • Copyright Information Palgrave Macmillan, a division of Macmillan Publishers Limited 1995
  • Publisher Name Palgrave Macmillan, London
  • eBook Packages Palgrave Religion & Philosophy Collection
  • Print ISBN 978-1-349-39323-7
  • Online ISBN 978-0-230-37951-0
  • About this book