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Game Theory and Business Applications

  • Book
  • © 2001

Overview

Editors:
  1. Kalyan Chatterjee

    1. Pennsylvania State University, USA

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    You can also search for this editor in PubMed   Google Scholar

  2. William F. Samuelson

    1. Boston University, USA

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    You can also search for this editor in PubMed   Google Scholar

Part of the book series: International Series in Operations Research & Management Science (ISOR, volume 35)

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Table of contents (12 chapters)

  1. Front Matter

    Pages i-x
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  2. Introduction

    • Kalyan Chatterjee, William Samuelson
    Pages 1-16

  3. Game Theory Models in Finance

    • Franklin Allen, Stephen Morris
    Pages 17-48

  4. Game Theory Models in Accounting

    • Chandra Kanodia
    Pages 49-94

  5. Game Theory Models in Operations Management and Information Systems

    • Lode Li, Seungjin Whang
    Pages 95-131

  6. Incentive Contracting and the Franchise Decision

    • Francine Lafontaine, Margaret E. Slade
    Pages 133-188

  7. Cooperative Games and Business Strategy

    • H. W. Stuart Jr.
    Pages 189-211

  8. Renegotiation in the Repeated Amnesty Dilemma, with Economic Applications

    • Joseph Farrell, Georg Weizsäcker
    Pages 213-246

  9. Reputation and Signalling Quality through Price Choice

    • Taradas Bandyopadhyay, Kalyan Chatterjee, Navendu Vasavada
    Pages 247-272

  10. Game Theory and the Practice of Bargaining

    • Kalyan Chatterjee
    Pages 273-294

  11. Auctions in Theory and Practice

    • William Samuelson
    Pages 295-338

  12. The Economics of Auctions and Bidder Collusion

    • Robert C. Marshall, Michael J. Meurer
    Pages 339-370

  13. Activity Rules for an Iterated Double Auction

    • Robert Wilson
    Pages 371-386

  14. Back Matter

    Pages 387-387
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Keywords

About this book

In the last twenty-five years, game theory has been applied to a growing number of practical problems: from antitrust analysis to monetary policy; from the design of auction institutions to the structuring of incentives within firms; from patent races to dispute resolution. The purpose of Game Theory and Business Applications is to expand these applications of game theory into a broad and meaningful view of the way business decisions can be modelled and analyzed. The chapter contents embrace a wide variety of business functions - from accounting to finance, to operations, to strategy, and to organizational design. In addition, specific application areas include numerous kinds of market competition, bargaining, auctions and competitive bidding. All of these applications involve competitive decision settings, specifically situations where a number of economic agents in pursuit of their respective self-interests take actions that together affect all of their fortunes. In the language of game theory, players take actions consistent with the given `rules of the game,' and these joint actions determine final outcomes and payoffs. As this volume demonstrates, game theory provides a compelling guide for business strategy.
The first section of this volume discusses game-theoretic applications in four functional areas of business: finance, accounting, operations management and information systems, and organization design. The second section considers competitive strategies in `imperfect' markets. Using cooperative and non-cooperative game-theoretic approaches, these four chapters consider various topics: spatial competition, signaling of product quality, trust and cooperation in ongoing relationships, strategic behavior in bargaining, and the `balance of power' between the firm and its buyers and suppliers. The last section of the book deals in detail with auctions and competitive bidding institutions. The emphasis is on the contributions of game theory to both auction theory and practice. Topics considered include optimal auctions, bidder collusion, and the design of institutions for selling the radio spectrum and trading electrical power.

Reviews

`...the book is recommended as a valuable stock-taking enterprise'
Operations Research Spektrum

Editors and Affiliations

  • Pennsylvania State University, USA

    Kalyan Chatterjee

  • Boston University, USA

    William F. Samuelson

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