Economic Signals

Prize Promotions, Anonymous Giving, and Political Advertisements

  • Masaoki Tamura

Part of the SpringerBriefs in Economics book series (BRIEFSECONOMICS)

Also part of the Development Bank of Japan Research Series book sub series (BRIEFSDBJRS)

Table of contents

  1. Front Matter
    Pages i-ix
  2. Masaoki Tamura
    Pages 1-5
  3. Masaoki Tamura
    Pages 23-35

About this book

Introduction

This Brief sheds new light on three specific aspects of economic behavior – companies offering prize promotions, individuals making anonymous donations, and politicians creating political advertisements. These are considered signals that firms send to consumers, donors send to others, and politicians send to voters, respectively. The author shows why firms, donors, and politicians employ these behaviors, and what their social consequences are from an economic theory perspective.

This book is intended for readers who are interested in industrial organization, the economics of giving, and political economics. Each topic can be seen as an application of simple economic theory to an unusual subject matter in economics. Thus, for students, this work also offers an introduction to analytical methods in time-inconsistency and involving asymmetric information. The problems and economic settings behind these topics are firms’ time-inconsistency in a monopoly, asymmetric information in individual altruism, and asymmetric information regarding types of politicians.

Keywords

Prize Promotion Anonymous Giving Signaling Microeconomics Industrial Organization Advertisement

Authors and affiliations

  • Masaoki Tamura
    • 1
  1. 1.Nagoya University of Commerce and BusinessNisshinJapan

Bibliographic information

  • DOI https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-10-8938-1
  • Copyright Information Development Bank of Japan 2018
  • Publisher Name Springer, Singapore
  • eBook Packages Economics and Finance
  • Print ISBN 978-981-10-8937-4
  • Online ISBN 978-981-10-8938-1
  • Series Print ISSN 2191-5504
  • Series Online ISSN 2191-5512
  • About this book