Economics and Management of Networks

1. Front Matter

   Pages I-VII

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2. Introducing ‘Economics and Management of Networks’

   1. Introducing ‘Economics and Management of Networks’

      • Josef Windsperger, Gérard Cliquet

      Pages 1-10

3. Franchising

   1. Front Matter

      Pages 11-11

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   2. Plural Form Governance Structure Issues Performance and Efficiency in Franchising Entrepreneurship and Strategic Management Issues

      1. Plural Form in Franchising: An Incomplete Contracting Approach

         • George Hendrikse, Tao Jiang

         Pages 13-29

      2. Franchisee Versus Company Ownership — An Empirical Analysis of Franchisor Profit

         • Thomas Ehrmann, Georg Spranger

         Pages 31-50

      3. Existence of the Plural Form Within Franchised Networks: Some Early Results from the US and French Markets

         • Rozenn Perrigot, Gérard Cliquet

         Pages 51-68

   3. Governance Structure Issues

      1. The Governance Structure of Franchising Firms: A Property Rights Approach

         • Josef Windsperger, Askin Yurdakul

         Pages 69-95

      2. Governance Inseparability in Franchising: Multi-case Study in France and Brazil

         • Paulo F. Azevedo, Vivian L. S. Silva

         Pages 97-115

      3. Entrepreneurial Autonomy, Incentives, and Relational Governance in Franchise Chains

         • Olivier Cochet, Julian Dormann, Thomas Ehrmann

         Pages 117-144

      4. Beneficially Constraining Franchisor’s Power

         • Thomas Ehrmann, Georg Spranger

         Pages 145-168

   4. Performance and Efficiency in Franchising

      1. A Cointegration Analysis of the Correlates of Performance in Franchised Channels

         • Rajiv P. Dant, Manish Kacker, Anne T. Coughlan, Jamie Emerson

         Pages 169-189

      2. Franchised Network Efficiency: A DEA Application to US Networks

         • Carlos Pestana Barros, Rozenn Perrigot

         Pages 191-212

   5. Entrepreneurship and Strategic Management Issues

      1. Franchising as Entrepreneurial Activity: Finnish SME Policy Perspective

         • Mika Tuunanen

         Pages 213-233

      2. Creating Franchised Businesses Through Franchisee Training Program — Empirical Evidence from a Follow-up Study

         • Jenni Torikka

         Pages 235-268

      3. Understanding Strategic Interactions in Franchise Relationships

         • Evelien Croonen

         Pages 269-289

4. Strategic Alliances

   1. Front Matter

      Pages 291-291

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   2. Governance Structure Issues Performance of Joint Ventures

      1. Administrative and Social Factors in the Governance Structure of European R&D Networks

         • Nieves Arranz, J. Carlos Fdez. de Arroyabe

         Pages 293-311

      2. Firm and Industrial Organization Frontiers: An Empirical Model of Inter-firm Network in the Winter Sports Industry

         • Rachel Bocquet

         Pages 313-341

      3. The Influence of Financial Institutions and Investor Behaviour on Company Management Practice

         • Tahir M. Nisar

         Pages 343-365

      4. International Audit Firms as Strategic Networks — The Evolution of Global Professional Service Firms

         • Hansrudi Lenz, Marianne L. James

         Pages 367-392

Previous research on the institutional structure of franchising networks (Bri- ley et al. 1991; Lutz 1995; Shane 1998; Lafontaine and Shaw 1999, 2005; - fuso 2002; Penard et al. 2003a,b) does not explain the governance structure of the franchising firm as an institutional entity that consists of two interrelated parts: Residual decision rights and ownership rights. The latter includes not only residual income rights of franchised outlets but also residual income rights of franchisor-owned outlets. Previous studies primarily examines the incentive, signalling and screening effects of fees, royalties and other contractual pro- sions from the point of view of organizational economics (see Dnes 1996 for a review) without taking into account the interactions between residual decision and residual income rights as interrelated parts of the governance structure. This paper fills this gap in the literature. According to the property rights view, de- sion rights should be allocated according to the distribution of intangible kno- edge assets between the franchisor and franchisee and ownership rights should be assigned according to the residual decision rights. Since ownership rights are diluted in franchising networks, the dilution of residual income rights of fr- chised outlets is compensated by residual income rights of company-owned o- lets. Under a dual ownership structure, company-owned outlets compensate the disincentive effect of low royalties for the franchisor, and low royalties strengthen the investment incentives for the franchisee.

• Entrepreneurs
• Entrepreneurship
• Franchising
• Import
• Industrial Organization
• Joint Ventures
• business
• design
• efficiency
• management
• organization
• organizations
• performance
• strategic management
• strategy

• IGR-IAE, University of Rennes 1, Rennes, Cedex 7, France

  Gérard Cliquet

• Faculty of Business and Information Technology, Department of Business and Management, University of Kuopio, Kuopio, Finland

  Mika Tuunanen

• RSM Erasmus University, Rotterdam, The Netherlands

  George Hendrikse

• Center of Business Studies, University of Vienna, Vienna, Austria

  Josef Windsperger

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