Agency Theory, Information, and Incentives

  • Günter Bamberg
  • Klaus Spremann

Table of contents

  1. Front Matter
    Pages I-XVIII
  2. Prologue

    1. Günter Bamberg, Klaus Spremann
      Pages 1-2
  3. Agency Theory and Risk Sharing

    1. Klaus Spremann
      Pages 3-37
    2. Günter Bamberg
      Pages 61-79
  4. Information and Incentives

  5. Capital Markets and Moral Hazard

    1. Jochen E. M. Wilhelm
      Pages 179-204
  6. Financial Contracting and Dividends

    1. Andreas Gruber
      Pages 205-227
    2. Thomas Hartmann-Wendels
      Pages 229-253
    3. Jan P. Krahnen, Georg Meran
      Pages 255-280
  7. External Accounting and Auditing

  8. Coordination in Groups

    1. Martin J. Beckmann
      Pages 379-388
    2. Martin Gaynor, Paul R. Kleindorfer
      Pages 389-414
    3. G. Feichtinger, G. Sorger
      Pages 415-438
  9. Property Rights and Fairness

  10. Agency Costs

  11. Back Matter
    Pages 511-534

About this book


Agency Theory is a new branch of economics which focusses on the roles of information and of incentives when individuals cooperate with respect to the utilisation of resources. Basic approaches are coming from microeco­ nomic theory as well as from risk analysis. Among the broad variety of ap­ plications are: the many designs of contractual arrangements, organiza­ tions, and institutions as well as the manifold aspects of the separation of ownership and control so fundamental for business finance. After some twenty years of intensive research in the field of information economics it might be timely to present the most basic issues, questions, models, and applications. This volume Agency Theory, Information, and Incentives offers introductory surveys as well as results of individual rese­ arch that seem to shape that field of information economics appropriately. Some 30 authors were invited to present their subjects in such a way that students could easily become acquainted with the main ideas of informa­ tion economics. So the aim of Agency Theory, Information, and Incentives is to introduce students at an intermediate level and to accompany their work in classes on microeconomics, information economics, organization, management theory, and business finance. The topics selected form the eight sections of the book: 1. Agency Theory and Risk Sharing 2. Information and Incentives 3. Capital Markets and Moral Hazard 4. Financial Contracting and Dividends 5. External Accounting and Auditing 6. Coordination in Groups 7. Property Rights and Fairness 8. Agency Costs.


Agency-Theorie Delegation Informationsökonomie Risikoanalyse cooperation institutions interaction microeconomics organization organizations public goods taxation theory of the firm

Editors and affiliations

  • Günter Bamberg
    • 1
  • Klaus Spremann
    • 2
  1. 1.Lehrstuhl für StatistikUniversität AugsburgAugsburgGermany
  2. 2.Abteilung WirtschaftswissenschaftenUniversität UlmUlmGermany

Bibliographic information

  • DOI
  • Copyright Information Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 1987
  • Publisher Name Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
  • eBook Packages Springer Book Archive
  • Print ISBN 978-3-540-51675-0
  • Online ISBN 978-3-642-75060-1
  • Buy this book on publisher's site