Stability and Perfection of Nash Equilibria

  • Eric van Damme

Table of contents

  1. Front Matter
    Pages I-XIX
  2. Eric van Damme
    Pages 1-21
  3. Eric van Damme
    Pages 22-45
  4. Eric van Damme
    Pages 46-62
  5. Eric van Damme
    Pages 63-79
  6. Eric van Damme
    Pages 80-100
  7. Eric van Damme
    Pages 101-129
  8. Eric van Damme
    Pages 130-165
  9. Eric van Damme
    Pages 166-213
  10. Eric van Damme
    Pages 214-258
  11. Eric van Damme
    Pages 259-317
  12. Back Matter
    Pages 318-339

About this book

Introduction

I have been pleased with the favourable reception of the first edition of this book and I am grateful to have the opportunity to prepare this second edition. In this revised and enlarged edition I corrected some misprints and errors that occurred in the first edition (fortunately I didn't find too many) and I added a large number of notes that give the reader an impression of what kind of results have been obtained since the first edition was printed and that give an indication of the direction the subject is taking. Many of the notes discuss (or refer to papers discussing) applications of the refinements that are considered. Of course, it is the quantity and the quality of the insights and the applications that lend the refinements their validity. Although the guide to the applications is far from complete, the notes certainly allow the reader to form a good judgement of which refinements have really yielded new insights. Hence, as in the first edition, I will refrain from speculating on which refinements of Nash equilibria will survive in the long run. To defend this position let me also cite Binmore [1990] who compares writing about refinements to the Herculean task of defeating the nine-headed Hydra which grew too heads for each that was struck off. It is a pleasure to have the opportunity to thank my secretary, Marjoleine de Wit, who skilfully and, as always, cheerfully typed the manuscript and did the proofreading.

Keywords

Nash Equilibrium Nash-Gleichgewicht Nicht-kooperative Spieltheorie Refinements Spieltheorie game theory

Authors and affiliations

  • Eric van Damme
    • 1
  1. 1.CentER for Economic ResearchTilburg UniversityLE TilburgThe Netherlands

Bibliographic information

  • DOI https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-58242-4
  • Copyright Information Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 1991
  • Publisher Name Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
  • eBook Packages Springer Book Archive
  • Print ISBN 978-3-540-53800-4
  • Online ISBN 978-3-642-58242-4
  • About this book