The Purification Problem for Constrained Games with Incomplete Information

  • Helmut Meister

Part of the Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems book series (LNE, volume 295)

Table of contents

  1. Front Matter
    Pages I-X
  2. Back Matter
    Pages 125-127

About this book

Introduction

The approach presented in this book combines two aspects of generalizations of the noncooperative game as developed by Nash. First, players choose their acts dependent on certain information variables, and second there are constraints on the sets of decisions for players. After the derivation of a general (Nash)equilibrium existence theorem, some results from purification theory are used to prove the existence of an approximate equilibrium in pure strategies, that is in nonrandomized decision functions. For some types of payoff-functions and constraints, these games prove to have an (exact) equilibrium in pure strategies. The reason for considering constrained games with incomplete information is that, apart from their game-theoretic importance, they have rather widespread application. Market games with a continuum of traders as well as some statistical decision problems are covered with this approach.

Keywords

decision theory equilibrium incomplete information strategy

Authors and affiliations

  • Helmut Meister
    • 1
  1. 1.Fachbereich Mathematik und InformatikFernuniversität HagenHagen 1Germany

Bibliographic information

  • DOI https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-50278-1
  • Copyright Information Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 1987
  • Publisher Name Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
  • eBook Packages Springer Book Archive
  • Print ISBN 978-3-540-18429-4
  • Online ISBN 978-3-642-50278-1
  • Series Print ISSN 0075-8442
  • About this book