Incentives, Overlays, and Economic Traffic Control

Third International Workshop, ETM 2010, Amsterdam, The Netherlands, September 6, 2010. Proceedings

  • Burkhard Stiller
  • Tobias Hoßfeld
  • George D. Stamoulis

Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 6236)

Table of contents

  1. Front Matter
  2. Keynote

  3. P2P and Overlay Management

    1. Konstantin Pussep, Sergey Kuleshov, Christian Gross, Sergios Soursos
      Pages 2-13
    2. Jan Seedorf, Saverio Niccolini, Martin Stiemerling, Ettore Ferranti, Rolf Winter
      Pages 14-26
    3. Simon Oechsner, Frank Lehrieder, Dirk Staehle
      Pages 27-38
  4. Evaluations and Estimations

    1. Mirja Kühlewind, Michael Scharf
      Pages 39-50
    2. Henna Warma, Tapio Levä, Lars Eggert, Heikki Hämmäinen, Jukka Manner
      Pages 64-75
  5. Short Papers

    1. Eitan Altman, Pierre Bernhard, Stephane Caron, George Kesidis, Julio Rojas-Mora, Sulan Wong
      Pages 76-84
    2. Hélène Le Cadre
      Pages 85-92
    3. Grażyna Suchacka, Leszek Borzemski
      Pages 93-100
    4. Thomas Wozniak, Katarina Stanoevska-Slabeva, Diogo Gomes, Hans D. Schotten
      Pages 101-108
  6. Back Matter

About these proceedings


Economic perspectives in network management have recently attracted a high level of attention. The Third Workshop on Economic Traffic Management (ETM 2010) was the continuation of two successful events that were held at the University of Zürich, Switzerland in 2008 and 2009. The main objective of ETM 2010 was to offer sci- tists, researchers, and operators the opportunity to present innovative research on ETM mechanisms, to discuss new related ideas and directions, and to strengthen the cooperation in the field of economics–technology interplay. Being co-located with the International Teletraffic Congress (ITC22), ETM 2010 brought together a new and fast-growing scientific community. The concept of ETM has emerged due to the fact that a multitude of different se- interested players are simultaneously active in the Internet. While such players may either compete or complement each other in the value chain for service providers, each of them has his own incentives and interests. To enable a win–win situation for all players involved (basically end users, Internet Service Providers (ISP), telec- munication operators, and service providers), new incentive-based approaches have been recently developed, tested, and even commercially deployed, which fall under the domain termed Economic Traffic Management (ETM). ETM mechanisms aim at improving efficiency within the network, e. g. , by reducing costs, while also impr- ing Quality-of-Experience (QoE) for end users or applications.


QoE QoS bandwith allocation cloud computing future internet game theory incentive-based concepts network architectures network efficiency network management overlay networks p2p security management self-organized networks service level agree

Editors and affiliations

  • Burkhard Stiller
    • 1
  • Tobias Hoßfeld
    • 2
  • George D. Stamoulis
    • 3
  1. 1.Communication Systems Group, CSG, Department of Informatics, IFIUniversity of Zurich, UZHZurichSwitzerland
  2. 2.Lehrstuhl fuer Informatik III, Am HublandUniversitaet WuerzburgWuerzburgGermany
  3. 3.Department of InformaticsAthens University of Economics and BusinessAthensGreece

Bibliographic information

  • DOI
  • Copyright Information Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2010
  • Publisher Name Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
  • eBook Packages Computer Science
  • Print ISBN 978-3-642-15484-3
  • Online ISBN 978-3-642-15485-0
  • Series Print ISSN 0302-9743
  • Series Online ISSN 1611-3349
  • About this book