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Strategic Social Choice

Stable Representations of Constitutions

  • Bezalel Peleg
  • Hans Peters

Part of the Studies in Choice and Welfare book series (WELFARE)

Table of contents

  1. Front Matter
    Pages i-xvii
  2. Representations of constitutions

    1. Front Matter
      Pages 1-1
    2. Bezalel Peleg, Hans Peters
      Pages 3-6
    3. Bezalel Peleg, Hans Peters
      Pages 7-20
    4. Bezalel Peleg, Hans Peters
      Pages 21-43
    5. Bezalel Peleg, Hans Peters
      Pages 45-57
    6. Bezalel Peleg, Hans Peters
      Pages 59-66
    7. Bezalel Peleg, Hans Peters
      Pages 67-79
    8. Bezalel Peleg, Hans Peters
      Pages 81-94
  3. Consistent voting

    1. Front Matter
      Pages 95-95
    2. Bezalel Peleg, Hans Peters
      Pages 97-103
    3. Bezalel Peleg, Hans Peters
      Pages 105-112
    4. Bezalel Peleg, Hans Peters
      Pages 123-145
  4. Back Matter
    Pages 147-154

About this book

Introduction

This monograph studies representations of effectivity functions by game forms that are at least Nash consistent, which means that they have a Nash equilibrium for any profile of preferences. In the second part the focus is on social choice functions that admit a strong Nash equilibrium resulting in the sincere outcome. A central interpretation of an effectivity function is that it models a constitution.

Keywords

Constitutions Effectivity functions Game forms Nash and strong Nash equilibrium Strategic stability modeling

Authors and affiliations

  • Bezalel Peleg
    • 1
  • Hans Peters
    • 2
  1. 1.Center for the Study of Rationality, Interactive Decision TheoryHebrew University of JerusalemJerusalemIsrael
  2. 2.Dept. Quantitative EconomicsMaastricht UniversityMaastrichtNetherlands

Bibliographic information

  • DOI https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-13875-1
  • Copyright Information Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2010
  • Publisher Name Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
  • eBook Packages Business and Economics
  • Print ISBN 978-3-642-13874-4
  • Online ISBN 978-3-642-13875-1
  • Series Print ISSN 1614-0311
  • Buy this book on publisher's site