Decision-Making in Committees

Game-Theoretic Analysis

  • Nicola Friederike Maaser

Part of the Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems book series (LNE, volume 635)

Table of contents

  1. Front Matter
    Pages 169-225
  2. Nicola F. Maaser
    Pages 1-40
  3. Nicola F. Maaser
    Pages 41-67
  4. Nicola F. Maaser
    Pages 69-93
  5. Nicola F. Maaser
    Pages 95-117
  6. Back Matter
    Pages 169-225

About this book

Introduction

Political and economic institutions are typically governed by committees that face the challenge to reconcile the preferences of their members. How should decision rules be designed to generate fair and sustainable agreements, for example if committee members represent groups of different sizes? This book uses game-theoretic concepts and models to address the issue of political decision-making processes. In addition to providing a survey on basic game-theoretic tools in the analysis of political decisions, the author looks at specific issues such as two-tiered voting systems or the influence of lobbyists on legislative committees, and shows how the models can be applied to real-world contexts such as the EU decision-making institutions.

Keywords

Committee Decision Rules European Union (EU) Political Games Voting Power calculus game theory

Authors and affiliations

  • Nicola Friederike Maaser
    • 1
  1. 1.LS für Volkswirtschaftslehre IV -Universität BayreuthBayreuthGermany

Bibliographic information

  • DOI https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-04153-2
  • Copyright Information Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2010
  • Publisher Name Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
  • eBook Packages Business and Economics
  • Print ISBN 978-3-642-04152-5
  • Online ISBN 978-3-642-04153-2
  • Series Print ISSN 0075-8442
  • About this book