Overview
- Presents a methodology for formally describing security protocols and their environment
- All technical chapters include problems, so the book is suited for graduate students of information security or formal methods
- Authors show the application of the methodology and the effectiveness of the analysis tool
- Includes supplementary material: sn.pub/extras
- Includes supplementary material: sn.pub/extras
Part of the book series: Information Security and Cryptography (ISC)
Access this book
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Other ways to access
Table of contents(8 chapters)
About this book
Security protocols are widely used to ensure secure communications over insecure networks, such as the internet or airwaves. These protocols use strong cryptography to prevent intruders from reading or modifying the messages. However, using cryptography is not enough to ensure their correctness. Combined with their typical small size, which suggests that one could easily assess their correctness, this often results in incorrectly designed protocols.
The authors present a methodology for formally describing security protocols and their environment. This methodology includes a model for describing protocols, their execution model, and the intruder model. The models are extended with a number of well-defined security properties, which capture the notions of correct protocols, and secrecy of data. The methodology can be used to prove that protocols satisfy these properties. Based on the model they have developed a tool set called Scyther that can automatically find attacks on security protocols or prove their correctness. In case studies they show the application of the methodology as well as the effectiveness of the analysis tool.
The methodology’s strong mathematical basis, the strong separation of concerns in the model, and the accompanying tool set make it ideally suited both for researchers and graduate students of information security or formal methods and for advanced professionals designing critical security protocols.
Reviews
"This book is a great resource for anyone who wants to do research in the security analysis of protocols. It is written in a textbook style by authors who have excellent command over the subject. It could be used for self-study too ... overall the book does superb justice to the subject in every aspect."
[Sashank Dara, Cisco Systems Inc., IACR Book Reviews, 12/2014]
Authors and Affiliations
-
Department of Computer Science, ETH Zürich, Zürich, Switzerland
Cas Cremers
-
Faculté des Sciences, de la Technologie, Université du Luxembourg, Luxembourg, Luxembourg
Sjouke Mauw
About the authors
The first author is a senior scientist working at the ETH Zürich, the second author is a professor at the Université du Luxembourg; both have a research focus and teaching responsibilities in the areas of information security, protocols, privacy, trust and formal methods.
Bibliographic Information
Book Title: Operational Semantics and Verification of Security Protocols
Authors: Cas Cremers, Sjouke Mauw
Series Title: Information Security and Cryptography
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-78636-8
Publisher: Springer Berlin, Heidelberg
eBook Packages: Computer Science, Computer Science (R0)
Copyright Information: Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2012
Hardcover ISBN: 978-3-540-78635-1Published: 31 October 2012
Softcover ISBN: 978-3-642-43053-4Published: 09 November 2014
eBook ISBN: 978-3-540-78636-8Published: 30 October 2012
Series ISSN: 1619-7100
Series E-ISSN: 2197-845X
Edition Number: 1
Number of Pages: XIV, 174
Topics: Data Structures and Information Theory, Computer Systems Organization and Communication Networks, Software Engineering/Programming and Operating Systems