Endogenous Public Policy and Contests

  • Gil S. Epstein
  • Shmuel Nitzan

Table of contents

  1. Front Matter
    Pages 1-16
  2. Introduction

    1. Pages 1-6
  3. The Basic Contest

    1. Front Matter
      Pages 7-7
    2. Pages 9-14
  4. The Extended Contest: With Government

  5. The Policy Effect

  6. The Extended Contest: Without Government

  7. Applications

    1. Front Matter
      Pages 121-121
    2. Pages 145-156
    3. Pages 157-176
    4. Pages 177-187
    5. Pages 189-202
  8. Back Matter
    Pages 203-221

About this book


This book studies endogenous policy determination focusing on the role of interest groups and their lobbying efforts in the determination of public policy. Applying strategic contest theory as the basic methodology, it clarifies the fundamental parameters that determine the behavior of the government and the interest groups - the two contestants for the "prizes" associated with public policy. The fundamental parameters are the objective of the government, political culture, the contest success function, the stakes of the interest groups and their characteristics. The analysis focuses on the relationship between these parameters and public policy, the contest winning probabilities of the interest groups and their efforts. Comprehensive illustrations of the usefulness of the proposed approach are provided in five specific cases: the determination of monopoly price, privatization policy, migration quotas, minimum wage and promotion in tournaments.     


Contests Endogenous Public Policy Government Interest Groups Lobby Lobbying Rent Seeking political culture public policy

Authors and affiliations

  • Gil S. Epstein
    • 1
  • Shmuel Nitzan
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of EconomicsBar-Ilan UniversityRamat-GanIsrael

Bibliographic information