Equilibrium Theory for Cournot Oligopolies and Related Games

Essays in Honour of Koji Okuguchi

Editors:

ISBN: 978-3-319-29253-3 (Print) 978-3-319-29254-0 (Online)

Table of contents (17 chapters)

  1. Front Matter

    Pages i-xii

  2. No Access

    Chapter

    Pages 1-5

    Introduction

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    Chapter

    Pages 7-13

    On the Works of Professor Koji Okuguchi

  4. No Access

    Chapter

    Pages 15-29

    Cournot, a Non-strategic Economist

  5. No Access

    Chapter

    Pages 31-45

    Cournot Tatonnement in Aggregative Games with Monotone Best Responses

  6. No Access

    Chapter

    Pages 47-61

    Existence and Uniqueness of Nash Equilibrium in Aggregative Games: An Expository Treatment

  7. No Access

    Chapter

    Pages 63-88

    On the Geometric Structure of the Cournot Equilibrium Set: The Case of Concave Industry Revenue and Convex Costs

  8. No Access

    Chapter

    Pages 89-100

    Pure Strategy Equilibria in Finite Symmetric Concave Games and an Application to Symmetric Discrete Cournot Games

  9. No Access

    Chapter

    Pages 101-118

    On a Discontinuous Cournot Oligopoly

  10. No Access

    Chapter

    Pages 119-131

    Interpreting Markups in Spanish Manufacturing: The Exponential Model

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    Chapter

    Pages 133-153

    Privatization Neutrality Theorem and Discriminatory Subsidy Policy

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    Chapter

    Pages 155-178

    Cournot Oligopoly Theory for Simple Electricity Markets

  13. No Access

    Chapter

    Pages 179-201

    Kant-Nash Equilibria in a Quantity-Setting Oligopoly

  14. No Access

    Chapter

    Pages 203-232

    Evolutionary Oligopoly Models of Commercial Fishing with Heterogeneities

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    Chapter

    Pages 233-244

    Existence, Uniqueness, and Comparative Statics in Contests

  16. No Access

    Chapter

    Pages 245-268

    Two-Group Contests with Communication Within and Between Groups

  17. No Access

    Chapter

    Pages 269-279

    On the Nash Equilibrium of Asymmetric Public-Good Contests

  18. No Access

    Chapter

    Pages 281-294

    Heterogeneity and Number of Players in Rent-Seeking, Innovation, and Patent-Race Games