Models in Cooperative Game Theory

Crisp, Fuzzy, and Multi-Choice Games

  • Rodica Branzei
  • Dinko Dimitrov
  • Stef Tijs

Part of the Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems book series (LNE, volume 556)

Table of contents

  1. Front Matter
    Pages I-VIII
  2. Cooperative Games with Crisp Coalitions

  3. Cooperative Games with Fuzzy Coalitions

    1. Pages 49-52
    2. Pages 67-87
    3. Pages 89-100
  4. Multichoice Games

  5. Back Matter
    Pages 129-135

About this book

Introduction

This book investigates the classical model of cooperative games with transfer­ able utility (TU-games) and models in which the players have the possibility to cooperate partially, namely fuzzy and multichoice games. In a crisp game the agents are either fully involved or not involved at all in cooperation with some other agents, while in a fuzzy game players are allowed to cooperate with infinitely many different participation levels, varying from non-cooperation to full cooperation. A multichoice game describes an intermediate case in which each player may have a fixed number of activity levels. Part I of the book is devoted to the most developed model in the theory of cooperative games, that of a classical TU-game with crisp coalitions, which we refer to as crisp game along the book. It presents basic notions, solutions concepts and classes of cooperative crisp games in such a way that allows the reader to use this part as a reference toolbox when studying the corresponding concepts from the theory of fuzzy games (Part II) and from the theory of multichoice games (Part III). The work on this book started while we were research fellows at ZiF (Biele­ feld) for the project "Procedural Approaches to Conflict Resolution", 2002.

Keywords

Finite Multi-choice Games cooperative games fuzzy games game theory

Authors and affiliations

  • Rodica Branzei
    • 1
  • Dinko Dimitrov
    • 2
  • Stef Tijs
    • 3
  1. 1.Faculty of Computer ScienceAlexandru Ioan Cuza UniversityIasiRomania
  2. 2.University of BielefeldBielefeldGermany
  3. 3.Faculty of Economics and Business AdministrationTilburg UniversityLE TilburgThe Netherlands

Bibliographic information

  • DOI https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-28509-1
  • Copyright Information Springer-Verlag Berlin/Heidelberg 2005
  • Publisher Name Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
  • eBook Packages Business and Economics
  • Print ISBN 978-3-540-26082-0
  • Online ISBN 978-3-540-28509-0
  • Series Print ISSN 0075-8442
  • About this book