Fault Diagnosis and Tolerance in Cryptography

Third International Workshop, FDTC 2006, Yokohama, Japan, October 10, 2006. Proceedings

  • Luca Breveglieri
  • Israel Koren
  • David Naccache
  • Jean-Pierre Seifert

Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 4236)

Table of contents

  1. Front Matter
  2. Attacks on Public Key Systems

    1. Shay Gueron, Jean-Pierre Seifert
      Pages 1-12
    2. Johannes Blömer, Martin Otto
      Pages 13-23
    3. Johannes Blömer, Martin Otto, Jean-Pierre Seifert
      Pages 36-52
    4. Sung-Ming Yen, Dongryeol Kim, SangJae Moon
      Pages 53-61
  3. Protection of Public Key Systems

    1. Guillaume Fumaroli, David Vigilant
      Pages 62-70
    2. L. Breveglieri, I. Koren, P. Maistri, M. Ravasio
      Pages 71-79
  4. Attacks on and Protection of Symmetric Key Systems

    1. Yannick Monnet, Marc Renaudin, Régis Leveugle, Christophe Clavier, Pascal Moitrel
      Pages 88-97
    2. L. Breveglieri, I. Koren, P. Maistri
      Pages 98-105
    3. Johannes Blömer, Volker Krummel
      Pages 106-120
  5. Models for Fault Attacks on Cryptographic Devices

  6. Fault-Resistant Arithmetic for Cryptography

    1. Gunnar Gaubatz, Berk Sunar, Mark G. Karpovsky
      Pages 173-184
    2. Konrad J. Kulikowski, Mark G. Karpovsky, Alexander Taubin
      Pages 185-195
  7. Fault Attacks and Other Security Threats

    1. Konrad J. Kulikowski, Mark G. Karpovsky, Alexander Taubin
      Pages 211-222

About these proceedings

Introduction

In recent years applied cryptography has developed considerably to satisfy the - creasing security requirements of various information technology disciplines, such as telecommunications, networking, database systems, mobile applications and others. Cryptosystems are inherently computationally complex and in order to satisfy the high throughput requirements of many applications, they are often implemented by means of either VLSI devices (cryptographic accelerators) or highly optimized software routines (cryptographic libraries) and are used via suitable (network) protocols. The sophistication of the underlying cryptographic algorithms, the high complexity of the implementations, and the easy access and low cost of cryptographic devices resulted in increased concerns regarding the reliability and security of crypto-devices. The effectiveness of side channel attacks on cryptographic devices, like timing and power-based attacks, has been known for some time. Several recent investigations have demonstrated the need to develop methodologies and techniques for designing robust cryptographic systems (both hardware and software) to protect them against both accidental faults and maliciously injected faults with the purpose of extracting the secret key. This trend has been particularly motivated by the fact that the equipment needed to carry out a successful side channel attack based on fault injection is easily accessible at a relatively low cost (for example, laser beam technology), and that the skills needed to use it are quite common. The identification of side channel attacks based on fault injections and the development of appropriate counter-measures have therefore become an active field of scientific and industrial research.

Keywords

AES AES attacks DES DOM RSA RSA attacks architecture attack countermeasures block ciphers cryptanalysis cryptographic devices cryptography cryptology finite field security

Editors and affiliations

  • Luca Breveglieri
    • 1
  • Israel Koren
    • 2
  • David Naccache
    • 3
  • Jean-Pierre Seifert
    • 4
  1. 1.Department of Electronics and Information TechnologyPolitecnico di MilanoMilanoItaly
  2. 2.Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering,University of MassachusettsAmherstUSA
  3. 3.École normale supérieure, Équipe de cryptographieParis cedex 05France
  4. 4.Institute for Computer ScienceUniversity of InnsbruckInnsbruckAustria

Bibliographic information

  • DOI https://doi.org/10.1007/11889700
  • Copyright Information Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2006
  • Publisher Name Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
  • eBook Packages Computer Science
  • Print ISBN 978-3-540-46250-7
  • Online ISBN 978-3-540-46251-4
  • Series Print ISSN 0302-9743
  • Series Online ISSN 1611-3349
  • About this book