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© 2006

THE LIMITS OF LOGICAL EMPIRICISM

SELECTED PAPERS OF ARTHUR PAP

  • ALFONS KEUPINK
  • SANFORD SHIEH

Benefits

  • Demonstrates the importance of Pap's work for the development of analytic philosophy of science

  • Illustrates how Pap's work was the central reference on modality in analytic philosophy before Kripke

  • Pap's writings in philosophy of science, modality, and philosophy of mathematics provide insightful alternative perspectives on philosophical problems of current interest

Book

Part of the SYNTHESE LIBRARY book series (SYLI, volume 334)

Table of contents

  1. PHILOSOPHY OF LOGIC AND MATHEMATICS

    1. ALFONS KEUPINK, SANFORD SHIEH
      Pages 243-246
  2. PHILOSOPHY OF MIND

    1. Front Matter
      Pages I-XIII
    2. ALFONS KEUPINK, SANFORD SHIEH
      Pages 249-268
    3. ALFONS KEUPINK, SANFORD SHIEH
      Pages 269-279
  3. PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE

    1. Front Matter
      Pages I-XIII
    2. ALFONS KEUPINK, SANFORD SHIEH
      Pages 285-293
    3. ALFONS KEUPINK, SANFORD SHIEH
      Pages 295-316
    4. ALFONS KEUPINK, SANFORD SHIEH
      Pages 317-326
    5. ALFONS KEUPINK, SANFORD SHIEH
      Pages 327-350
    6. ALFONS KEUPINK, SANFORD SHIEH
      Pages 351-362
  4. ARTHUR PAP’S LIFE AND Writings

    1. Front Matter
      Pages I-XIII
    2. PAULINE PAP
      Pages 369-374
    3. ALFONS KEUPINK
      Pages 375-379
  5. Back Matter
    Pages 381-394

About this book

Introduction

This volume brings together a selection of the most philosophically significant papers of Arthur Pap. As Sanford Shieh explains in the Introduction to this volume, Pap’s work played an important role in the development of the analytic tradition. This role goes beyond the merely historical fact that Pap’s views of dispositional and modal concepts were influential. As a sympathetic critic of logical empiricism, Pap, like Quine, saw a deep tension in logical empiricism at its very best, in the work of Carnap. But Pap’s critique of Carnap is quite different from Quine’s, and represents the discovery of limits beyond which empiricism cannot go, where there lies nothing other than intuitive knowledge of logic itself. Pap’s arguments for this intuitive knowledge anticipate Etchemendy’s recent critique of the model-theoretic account of logical consequence. Pap’s work also anticipates prominent developments in the contemporary neo-Fregean philosophy of mathematics championed by Wright and Hale. Finally, Pap’s major philosophical preoccupation, the concepts of necessity and possibility, provides distinctive solutions and perspectives on issues of contemporary concern in the metaphysics of modality. In particular, Pap’s account of modality allows us to see the significance of Kripke’s well-known arguments on necessity and apriority in a new light.

This volume will be of interest to all researchers in the philosophical history of the analytic tradition, in philosophy of logic, philosophy of mathematics, and contemporary analytic metaphysics.

Keywords

Proposition Rudolf Carnap dispositions interpret knowledge logic logical consequence logical empiricism logicism metaphysics modality philosophy reduction science truth

Editors and affiliations

  • ALFONS KEUPINK
    • 1
  • SANFORD SHIEH
    • 2
  1. 1.University of GroningenThe Netherlands
  2. 2.Wesleyan UniversityMiddletownU.S.A.

Bibliographic information