Differential Information Economies

  • Dionysius Glycopantis
  • Nicholas C. Yannelis

Part of the Studies in Economic Theory book series (ECON.THEORY, volume 19)

Table of contents

  1. Front Matter
    Pages I-XIII
  2. Dionysius Glycopantis, Nicholas C. Yannelis
    Pages 1-53
  3. Core Notions, Existence Results

  4. Core and Walrasian Expectations Equilibrium Equivalence

  5. Core, Pareto Optimality and Incentive Compatibility

About this book

Introduction

One of the main problems in current economic theory is to write contracts which are Pareto optimal, incentive compatible, and also implementable as a perfect Bayesian equilibrium of a dynamic, noncooperative game. The question arises whether it is possible to provide Walrasian type or cooperative equilibrium concepts which have these properties. This volume contains original contributions on noncooperative and cooperative equilibrium notions in economies with differential information and provides answers to the above questions. Moreover, issues of stability, learning and continuity of alternative equilibria are also examined. 

Keywords

Differential Information Economies Equilibrium Theory bargaining cooperative games economic theory economics efficiency equilibrium incomplete information information theory mathematical economics

Editors and affiliations

  • Dionysius Glycopantis
    • 1
  • Nicholas C. Yannelis
    • 2
  1. 1.Department of EconomicsCity UniversityLondonGreat Britain
  2. 2.Department of EconomicsUniversity of IllinoisChampaignUSA

Bibliographic information

  • DOI https://doi.org/10.1007/b138401
  • Copyright Information Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2005
  • Publisher Name Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
  • eBook Packages Business and Economics
  • Print ISBN 978-3-540-21424-3
  • Online ISBN 978-3-540-26979-3
  • Series Print ISSN 1431-8849
  • About this book