Individuals, Essence and Identity

Themes of Analytic Metaphysics

  • Andrea Bottani
  • Massimiliano Carrara
  • Pierdaniele Giaretta

Part of the Topoi Library book series (TOPI, volume 4)

Table of contents

  1. Front Matter
    Pages i-xv
  2. Ontology and Analysis

    1. Front Matter
      Pages 1-1
    2. Kit Fine
      Pages 3-48
    3. Achille C. Varzi
      Pages 49-75
  3. Essence and Existence

  4. Identity

    1. Front Matter
      Pages 215-215
    2. Mario Mignucci
      Pages 217-238
    3. Paolo Crivelli
      Pages 239-245
    4. David Wiggins
      Pages 247-265
    5. Timothy Williamson
      Pages 273-303
    6. Graeme Forbes
      Pages 319-340
    7. Penelope Mackie
      Pages 341-352
  5. Time and Persistence

    1. Front Matter
      Pages 353-353
    2. Richard Glauser
      Pages 369-385
    3. Peter van Inwagen
      Pages 387-411
    4. Uwe Meixner
      Pages 427-449
    5. Christopher Hughes
      Pages 451-475
  6. Back Matter
    Pages 477-501

About this book


Andrea Bottani Massimiliano Carrara Pierdaniele Giaretta What do we do when we do metaphysics? The aim of this introduction is to give a provisional answer to this question, and then to explain the subtitle of the volume. It is easy to observe that when we do meta­ physics we engage in a linguistic activity, mainly consisting of uttering declarative sentences that are not very clear to most people. That is true, but, of course, it is not very informative. What do we speak of when we do metaphysics? A traditional answer could be: we speak of what things really are, so suggesting that things can appear in a way that is different from the way they really are. So understood, meta­ physics is about the sense, or the senses, of "real being". A question that immediately arises is whether the sense of being is unique or is different for different types of things. Another question is whether it is possible that something could appear to be, but really not be. Modem analytic metaphysicians usually answer that the sense of being is unique, while acknowledging that there are different kinds of things, and that to say that something could appear to be but really not be is a plain contradiction, unless what is understood is that it could appear to us that there is something having such and such features, but viii Individuals, Essence, and Identity really there is no such a thing.


Aristotle metaphysics ontology

Editors and affiliations

  • Andrea Bottani
    • 1
  • Massimiliano Carrara
    • 2
  • Pierdaniele Giaretta
    • 2
  1. 1.Università di BergamoItaly
  2. 2.Università di PadovaItaly

Bibliographic information

  • DOI
  • Copyright Information Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2002
  • Publisher Name Springer, Dordrecht
  • eBook Packages Springer Book Archive
  • Print ISBN 978-90-481-5988-8
  • Online ISBN 978-94-017-1866-0
  • Series Print ISSN 1389-689X
  • Buy this book on publisher's site