Game Theory, Experience, Rationality

Foundations of Social Sciences, Economics and Ethics. In Honor of John C. Harsanyi

  • Werner Leinfellner
  • Eckehart Köhler

Part of the Vienna Circle Institute Yearbook [1997] book series (VCIY, volume 5)

Table of contents

  1. Front Matter
    Pages I-X
  2. Introduction

    1. Werner Leinfellner
      Pages 1-8
  3. Articles

    1. Keynote Lecture

      1. Reinhard Selten
        Pages 9-34
    2. Rationality and the Foundations of the Social Sciences

      1. Anatol Rapoport
        Pages 35-48
      2. Thomas C. Schelling
        Pages 49-53
      3. John D. Hey
        Pages 55-66
      4. Daniel M. Hausman
        Pages 67-79
      5. Julian Nida-Rümelin
        Pages 81-93
      6. Matthias Hild, Richard Jeffrey, Mathias Risse
        Pages 109-115
    3. Cooperation and Rationality

      1. Edward F. McClennen
        Pages 117-129
      2. Karl Sigmund, Maarten Boerlijst, Martin A. Nowak
        Pages 131-139
    4. Rationality and Economics

    5. Bayesian Theory and Rationality

    6. Evolutionary Game Theory and Game Dynamics

    7. Ethics and Game Theory

    8. Applications of Game Theory

      1. Dean P. Foster, H. Peyton Young
        Pages 325-335
  4. Report — Documentation

    1. Christoph Hofinger, Oliver Holle, Markus Knell
      Pages 369-378
  5. Review Essay

    1. Gerhard Benetka
      Pages 379-386
    2. Karl H. Müller
      Pages 387-395
  6. Reviews

    1. Thomas Mormann
      Pages 397-402
  7. Back Matter
    Pages 449-461

About this book


When von Neumann's and Morgenstern's Theory of Games and Economic Behavior appeared in 1944, one thought that a complete theory of strategic social behavior had appeared out of nowhere. However, game theory has, to this very day, remained a fast-growing assemblage of models which have gradually been united in a new social theory - a theory that is far from being completed even after recent advances in game theory, as evidenced by the work of the three Nobel Prize winners, John F. Nash, John C. Harsanyi, and Reinhard Selten. Two of them, Harsanyi and Selten, have contributed important articles to the present volume. This book leaves no doubt that the game-theoretical models are on the right track to becoming a respectable new theory, just like the great theories of the twentieth century originated from formerly separate models which merged in the course of decades. For social scientists, the age of great discover­ ies is not over. The recent advances of today's game theory surpass by far the results of traditional game theory. For example, modem game theory has a new empirical and social foundation, namely, societal experiences; this has changed its methods, its "rationality. " Morgenstern (I worked together with him for four years) dreamed of an encompassing theory of social behavior. With the inclusion of the concept of evolution in mathematical form, this dream will become true. Perhaps the new foundation will even lead to a new name, "conflict theory" instead of "game theory.


agents decision theory ethics game theory probability

Editors and affiliations

  • Werner Leinfellner
    • 1
  • Eckehart Köhler
    • 2
  1. 1.University of Nebraska and University of GrazAustria
  2. 2.Institute Vienna CircleUniversity of ViennaViennaAustria

Bibliographic information

  • DOI
  • Copyright Information Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 1998
  • Publisher Name Springer, Dordrecht
  • eBook Packages Springer Book Archive
  • Print ISBN 978-90-481-4992-6
  • Online ISBN 978-94-017-1654-3
  • Series Print ISSN 0929-6328
  • Buy this book on publisher's site