© 2003

Toleration, Neutrality and Democracy

  • Dario Castiglione
  • Catriona McKinnon

Table of contents

  1. Front Matter
    Pages i-x
  2. Introduction

    1. Catriona Mckinnon, Dario Castiglione
      Pages 1-7
  3. Toleration: Moral and Political

    1. Front Matter
      Pages 9-9
    2. Barry Barnes
      Pages 11-22
    3. Anna Elisabetta Galeotti
      Pages 47-62
  4. Toleration and Neutrality

    1. Front Matter
      Pages 63-63
    2. Robert Paul Churchill
      Pages 65-76
    3. Saladin Meckled-Garcia
      Pages 77-95
    4. Graham Finlay
      Pages 125-139
  5. Toleration and Democracy

    1. Front Matter
      Pages 141-141
    2. Glen Newey
      Pages 143-158
    3. Frederic R. Kellogg
      Pages 159-167
    4. Maurizio Passerin d’Entrèves
      Pages 169-179
  6. Back Matter
    Pages 181-188

About this book


Catriona McKinnon and Dario Castiglione It is not an overstatement to say that toleration is one of the most important issues for the defmition of a moral and political theory with application to modem globalised societies. Toleration is a value which no politician in any liberal democratic society would dare to reject. In the UK, its value is reflected in the learning outcomes of education for citizenship isolated by the Final Report of the Advisory Group on Citizenship (which schools have a statutory responsibility to deliver): children ought to be disposed to the 'practice of toleration', and have the 'ability to tolerate other view points'. In these days of feelings of heightened insecurity prompting suspicion of strangers and departures from the norm, toleration has again taken centre stage as one of the values defmitive of stable and just liberal democratic societies. Toleration is a matter of principled restraint with respect to differences which are opposed, either at the personal or at the political level. With respect to the former level, the tolerant person does not use the power she has over others she dislikes and/or disapproves of to interfere with them. However, the tolerant person does not thereby divest herself of her dislike or disapproval; the tolerant person does not transform her dislike and disapproval into warm feelings, and neither does she simply become indifferent to what she hitherto disliked and disapproved of when she practices toleration.


Institution John Stuart Mill democracy morality

Editors and affiliations

  • Dario Castiglione
    • 1
  • Catriona McKinnon
    • 2
  1. 1.Department of PoliticsUniversity of ExeterUK
  2. 2.Department of PoliticsUniversity of YorkUK

Bibliographic information