Bonus Options in Health Insurance

  • Peter Zweifel

Part of the Developments in Health Economics and Public Policy book series (HEPP, volume 2)

Table of contents

  1. Front Matter
    Pages i-xii
  2. Peter Zweifel
    Pages 25-41
  3. Peter Zweifel
    Pages 42-63
  4. Peter Zweifel
    Pages 70-78
  5. Peter Zweifel
    Pages 104-111
  6. Back Matter
    Pages 112-143

About this book


Confronted with the continuing cost expansion in the health care sector, policy makers face a dilemma: limiting moral hazard in medical care requires that consumers participate in the cost, yet copayment is strongly resisted by today's socially insured. Thus, the experiences of three private German health insurers will be of interest to physicians, social scientists, and policy makers. Insurer A writes conventional plans with deductibles and coinsurance; B pays back three-monthly premiums as a fixed rebate for no claims; while C runs an experience-rated bonus system starting with a rebate of three-monthly premiums for the first year without a claim, reaching a maximum of five after three years. While both rebates and bonuses are quite popular among insureds, this study shows that bonus options are particularly effective in limiting the demand for ambulatory and even hospital care. But what about adverse effects on health caused by the desire to save one's bonus? On this issue, there is some surprising evidence.


health health care hospital

Authors and affiliations

  • Peter Zweifel
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of EconomicsUniversity of ZürichSwitzerland

Bibliographic information

  • DOI
  • Copyright Information Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 1992
  • Publisher Name Springer, Dordrecht
  • eBook Packages Springer Book Archive
  • Print ISBN 978-94-010-5117-0
  • Online ISBN 978-94-011-2530-7
  • Series Print ISSN 0927-4987
  • Buy this book on publisher's site