Seeing the Self

Heidegger on Subjectivity

  • Einar Øverenget

Part of the Phaenomenologica book series (PHAE, volume 149)

Table of contents

  1. Front Matter
    Pages i-vii
  2. Einar Øverenget
    Pages 1-6
  3. Einar Øverenget
    Pages 7-33
  4. Einar Øverenget
    Pages 34-71
  5. Einar Øverenget
    Pages 72-104
  6. Einar Øverenget
    Pages 105-138
  7. Einar Øverenget
    Pages 139-165
  8. Einar Øverenget
    Pages 166-198
  9. Einar Øverenget
    Pages 199-231
  10. Einar Øverenget
    Pages 232-269
  11. Einar Øverenget
    Pages 270-312
  12. Einar Øverenget
    Pages 313-314
  13. Back Matter
    Pages 315-336

About this book


" . . . die Augen hat mir Husserl eingesetzt. ,,1 he aim of Twentieth century phenomenology is to provide a non­ T psychologistic interpretation of subjectivity. Husserl agrees with Frege; to adopt psychologism is to give up truth. But this should not prevent us from investigating the subjective perspective. On the contrary, Husserl thinks that an appropriate rejection of psychologism must be able to show how propositions are correlated to and grounded in subjective intuitions without thereby reducing them to psychological phenomena. Obviously this calls for an interpretation of subjectivity that makes a sharp distinction between the subjective perspective and the psychological realm. Phenomenology is devoted to the development of a notion of subjectivity that is in accordance with our experience of the world. A fundamental tenet of phenomenology is that philosophy should not dispute this experience but rather account for it. Hence, phenomenology must avoid a notion of subjectivity in which it becomes a problem to account for how a subject can ever hook up with the world. In other words, a phenomenological interpretation of subjectivity must radically disassociate itself from what is often referred to as a worldless, Cartesian subject, a res cogitans. But neither can an interpretation of SUbjectivity consistently advocate a position according to which the human order is described only in the categories appropriate to the physical order. Such an interpretation is obviously not compatible with the phenomenal basis for undertaking this very interpretation, that is, our experience of the world.


Edmund Husserl event Martin Heidegger phenomenology philosophy truth

Authors and affiliations

  • Einar Øverenget
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyUniversity of OsloOsloNorway

Bibliographic information

  • DOI
  • Copyright Information Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 1998
  • Publisher Name Springer, Dordrecht
  • eBook Packages Springer Book Archive
  • Print ISBN 978-1-4020-0259-5
  • Online ISBN 978-94-010-9768-0
  • Series Print ISSN 0079-1350
  • Buy this book on publisher's site