The Theory of Categories

  • Authors
  • Franz Brentano

Part of the Melbourne International Philosophy Series book series (NIPS, volume 8)

Table of contents

  1. Front Matter
    Pages I-IX
  2. Introduction to the Theory of Categories

    1. Franz Brentano
      Pages 1-11
  3. The Strict and the Extended Senses of Being

    1. Front Matter
      Pages 13-13
    2. Franz Brentano
      Pages 34-57
    3. Franz Brentano
      Pages 58-77
  4. Preliminary Studies for the Theory of Categories

    1. Front Matter
      Pages 79-79
    2. Franz Brentano
      Pages 101-124
    3. Franz Brentano
      Pages 125-146
  5. The Final Three Drafts of the Theory of Categories (1916)

  6. Back Matter
    Pages 213-275

About this book


This book contains the definitive statement of Franz Brentano's views on meta­ physics. It is made up of essays which were dictated by Brentano during the last ten years of his life, between 1907 and 1917. These dictations were assembled and edited by Alfred Kastil and first published by the Felix Meiner Verlag in 1933 under the title Kategorienlehre. Kastil added copious notes to Brentano's text. These notes have been included, with some slight omissions, in the present edition; the bibliographical references have been brought up to date. Brentano's approach to philosophy is unfamiliar to many contemporay readers. I shall discuss below certain fundamental points which such readers are likely to find the most difficult. I believe that once these points are properly understood, then what Brentano has to say will be seen to be of first importance to philosophy. THE PRIMACY OF THE INTENTIONAL To understand Brentano's theory of being, one must realize that he appeals to what he calls inner perception for his paradigmatic uses of the word "is". For inner perception, according to Brentano, is the source of our knowledge of the nature of being, just as it is the source of our knowledge of the nature of truth and of the nature of good and evil. And what can be said about the being of things that are not apprehended in inner perception can be understood only by analogy with what we are able to say about ourselves as thinking subjects.


Aristotle Immanuel Kant intention interpret knowledge philosophy psychology truth

Bibliographic information

  • DOI
  • Copyright Information Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 1981
  • Publisher Name Springer, Dordrecht
  • eBook Packages Springer Book Archive
  • Print ISBN 978-94-009-8191-1
  • Online ISBN 978-94-009-8189-8
  • Series Print ISSN 0924-4530
  • Buy this book on publisher's site