Perspectives on Mind

  • Herbert R. Otto
  • James A. Tuedio

Part of the Synthese Library book series (SYLI, volume 194)

Table of contents

  1. Front Matter
    Pages i-ix
  2. Introduction

    1. Herbert R. Otto, James A. Tuedio
      Pages 1-2
  3. Brain States, Machine States, and Consciousness

    1. Consciousness

      1. Georges Rey
        Pages 5-24
      2. David Woodruff Smith
        Pages 25-34
    2. Correspondence

    3. Representation

      1. Kathleen Emmett
        Pages 77-84
      2. Hubert L. Dreyfus
        Pages 85-104
  4. Structures of Mental Processing

    1. Qualia

      1. James H. Moor
        Pages 107-118
      2. Robert van Gulick
        Pages 119-126
      3. Henry W. Johnstone Jr.
        Pages 127-136
    2. Intentionality

    3. Transaction

  5. Mind, Meaning, and Language

    1. Schemas

    2. Background

      1. Christopher A. Fields
        Pages 261-274
      2. Norton Nelkin
        Pages 275-282
      3. Robert C. Richardson
        Pages 283-292
    3. Translation

      1. Herbert R. Otto
        Pages 293-314
      2. Herbert E. Hendry
        Pages 315-324
  6. Prospects for Dialogue and Synthesis

    1. Convergence

      1. R. W. Sleeper
        Pages 355-364
      2. James Munz
        Pages 365-370
    2. Dialogue

      1. Herbert R. Otto, James A. Tuedio
        Pages 371-376
  7. Back Matter
    Pages 377-420

About this book


Phenomenology and analytic philosophy have skirmished often, but seldom in ways conducive to dialectical progress. Generally, the skirmishes seem more "political" than philosophical, as when one side ridicules the methods of the other or criticizes the viability of the other's issues and assump­ tions. Analytic interest in third person objectivity is often spurned by Continental philosophers as being unduly abstract. Continental interest in first person subjectivity is often criticized by analysts as being muddled and imprecise. Logical analysis confronts the power of metaphor and judges it "too ambiguous" for rigorous philosophical activity. The language of metaphor confronts the power of logical analysis and deems it "too restric­ tive" for describing the nature and structures of authentic human exper­ ience. But are the two approaches really incompatible? Perhaps because each side of the "divide" has been working at problems largely uninteresting to the "opposition" it has been easy to ignore or underestimate the importance of this issue. But now each side is being led into a common field of problems associated with the nature of mind, and there is a new urgency to the need for examining carefully the question of conceptual compatibility and the potential for dialogue. Analytic thinkers are typically in the business of concept clarification and objective certi­ fication. Continental philosophers employ introspection in the interest of a project of description and classification that aims to be true to the full subtlety and complexity of the human condition.


Edmund Husserl animals concept consciousness dialectic dialogue intention knowledge language logical analysis mind naturalism philosophy of mind pragmatism robot

Editors and affiliations

  • Herbert R. Otto
    • 1
  • James A. Tuedio
    • 2
  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyPlymouth State College (USNH)USA
  2. 2.Department of PhilosophyCalifornia State UniversityStanislausUSA

Bibliographic information

  • DOI
  • Copyright Information Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 1988
  • Publisher Name Springer, Dordrecht
  • eBook Packages Springer Book Archive
  • Print ISBN 978-94-010-8290-7
  • Online ISBN 978-94-009-4033-8
  • Buy this book on publisher's site