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The Competitive State

Villa Colombella Papers on Competitive Politics

  • Albert Breton
  • Gianluigi Galeotti
  • Pierre Salmon
  • Ronald Wintrobe

Part of the International Studies in Economics and Econometrics book series (ISEE, volume 21)

Table of contents

  1. Front Matter
    Pages I-VII
  2. Introduction

    1. Albert Breton, Gianluigi Galeotti, Pierre Salmon, Ronald Wintrobe
      Pages 1-10
  3. Checks and balances in the supply of government policies

  4. New dimensions of electoral dimension

    1. Front Matter
      Pages 69-69
    2. Gianluigi Galeotti
      Pages 113-127
    3. Robert A. Young
      Pages 129-145
  5. International aspects of political competition

    1. Front Matter
      Pages 167-167
  6. Competition and the law

    1. Front Matter
      Pages 205-205
    2. Ugo Mattei, Francesco Pulitini
      Pages 207-219
  7. Back Matter
    Pages 257-275

About this book

Introduction

I. The concept of competition played a central role in the very first attempts to apply the tools of economics to the analysis of politics. Adopting Hotelling's (1929) industrial organization model of imperfect competition in markets in which space has a predominant role, Downs (1957), following on some perceptive insights of Schumpeter (1942), was able to formulate a model of electoral competition in which political parties, seeking the support of citizens, compete against each other in offering policies designed to elicit their vote. Downs' model and the numerous variants to which it gave birth soon became the major component of what was to become Public Choice Theory. The enormous efforts of the last 30 years devoted to modelling electoral competition have helped improve our understanding of politics and have contributed a basic element that undoubtedly will remain essential to any reasonably complete theory of politics. But whatever may have been early expectations, it is now clear that electoral competition will only be one such element. More recently, the idea of competition has been used to model interest-group behavior. Becker (1983), building on earlier work by Bentley (1908), Truman (1958), Olson (1965), Stigler (1971) and Peltzman (1976), applied the Public Finance analysis of the excess-burden of taxes and subsidies - to which, incidentally, Hotelling (1938) had made pioneering contribution- to produce a model in which competition between interest groups determines an equilibrium distribution of income.

Keywords

Public Sector USA competition organization organizations science and technology taxation

Editors and affiliations

  • Albert Breton
    • 1
  • Gianluigi Galeotti
    • 2
  • Pierre Salmon
    • 3
  • Ronald Wintrobe
    • 4
  1. 1.University of TorontoCanada
  2. 2.University of PerugiaItaly
  3. 3.University of BourgogneFrance
  4. 4.University of Western OntarioCanada

Bibliographic information

  • DOI https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-0645-7
  • Copyright Information Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 1991
  • Publisher Name Springer, Dordrecht
  • eBook Packages Springer Book Archive
  • Print ISBN 978-94-010-6775-1
  • Online ISBN 978-94-009-0645-7
  • Series Print ISSN 0924-5170
  • Buy this book on publisher's site