Advertisement

Political Economy of the Swiss National Bank

  • Bruno Jeitziner

Part of the Contributions to Economics book series (CE)

Table of contents

About this book

Introduction

Political Economy of the Swiss National Bank examines whether there exists any systematic political influence on Swiss monetary policy. A partial adjustment model is used to derive the reaction functions. Models of political business cycles and the theory of legislative control are for the first time applied to the Swiss institutional setting. The inflationary performance of the National Bank is not explained with the legal relationship between the executive branch of government and the central bank. It is interpreted as the result of the structure of the executive (commission government) and the characteristics of the Swiss political market for monetary policy. In empirical tests no indirect political influence, defined as a systematic relationship between fiscal and monetary policy, and no direct political influence from elections, the executive and the legislature can be detected.

Keywords

Central Bank Geldpolitik Inflation Monetary Policy National Bank Nationalbank Public Choice Schweiz Switzerland Währungspolitik Zentralbank political economy

Authors and affiliations

  • Bruno Jeitziner
    • 1
  1. 1.University of FreiburgFreiburgSwitzerland

Bibliographic information

  • DOI https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-99811-9
  • Copyright Information Physica-Verlag Heidelberg 1999
  • Publisher Name Physica-Verlag HD
  • eBook Packages Springer Book Archive
  • Print ISBN 978-3-7908-1209-1
  • Online ISBN 978-3-642-99811-9
  • Series Print ISSN 1431-1933
  • Buy this book on publisher's site