Stability and Perfection of Nash Equilibria

  • Eric van Damme

Table of contents

  1. Front Matter
    Pages I-XVII
  2. Eric van Damme
    Pages 1-20
  3. Eric van Damme
    Pages 21-44
  4. Eric van Damme
    Pages 45-61
  5. Eric van Damme
    Pages 62-77
  6. Eric van Damme
    Pages 78-98
  7. Eric van Damme
    Pages 99-126
  8. Eric van Damme
    Pages 127-161
  9. Eric van Damme
    Pages 162-207
  10. Eric van Damme
    Pages 208-251
  11. Eric van Damme
    Pages 252-304
  12. Back Matter
    Pages 305-318

About this book


The last decade has seen a steady increase in the application of concepts from noncooperative game theory to such diverse fields as economics, political science, law, operations research, biology and social psychology. As a byproduct of this increased activity, there has been a growing awareness of the fact that the basic noncooperative solution concept, that of Nash equilibrium, suffers from severe drawbacks. The two main shortcomings of this concept are the following: (i) In extensive form games, a Nash strategy may prescribe off the equilibrium path behavior that is manifestly irrational. (Specifically, Nash equilibria may involve incredible threats), (ii) Nash equilibria need not be robust with respect to small perturbations in the data of the game. Confronted with the growing evidence to the detriment of the Nash concept, game theorists were prompted to search for more refined equilibrium notions with better properties and they have come up with a wide array of alternative solution concepts. This book surveys the most important refinements that have been introduced. Its objectives are fourfold (i) to illustrate desirable properties as well as drawbacks of the various equilibrium notions by means of simple specific examples, (ii) to study the relationships between the various refinements, (iii) to derive simplifying characterizations, and (iv) to discuss the plausibility of the assumptions underlying the concepts.


economics equilibrium game theory incomplete information population dynamics strategy

Authors and affiliations

  • Eric van Damme
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of EconomicsUniversity of BonnBonn 1Germany

Bibliographic information

  • DOI
  • Copyright Information Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 1987
  • Publisher Name Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
  • eBook Packages Springer Book Archive
  • Print ISBN 978-3-642-96980-5
  • Online ISBN 978-3-642-96978-2
  • Buy this book on publisher's site