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Aggregation and Representation of Preferences

Introduction to Mathematical Theory of Democracy

  • Andranick S. Tanguiane

Table of contents

  1. Front Matter
    Pages i-ix
  2. Andranick S. Tanguiane
    Pages 1-6
  3. Andranick S. Tanguiane
    Pages 7-22
  4. Andranick S. Tanguiane
    Pages 23-50
  5. Andranick S. Tanguiane
    Pages 51-77
  6. Andranick S. Tanguiane
    Pages 79-88
  7. Andranick S. Tanguiane
    Pages 89-120
  8. Andranick S. Tanguiane
    Pages 121-155
  9. Andranick S. Tanguiane
    Pages 157-216
  10. Andranick S. Tanguiane
    Pages 217-249
  11. Andranick S. Tanguiane
    Pages 251-279
  12. Andranick S. Tanguiane
    Pages 281-283
  13. Back Matter
    Pages 285-331

About this book

Introduction

Aggregation is the conjunction of information, aimed at its compact represen­ tation. Any time when the totality of data is described in terms of general­ ized indicators, conventional counts, typical representatives and characteristic dependences, one directly or indirectly deals with aggregation. It includes revealing the most significant characteristics and distinctive features, quanti­ tative and qualitative analysis. As a result, the information becomes adaptable for further processing and convenient for human perception. Aggregation is widely used in economics, statistics, management, planning, system analysis, and many other fields. That is why aggregation is so important in data pro­ cessing. Aggregation of preferences is a particular case of the general problem of ag­ gregation. It arises in multicriteria decision-making and collective choice, when a set of alternatives has to be ordered with respect to contradicting criteria, or various individual opinions. However, in spite of apparent similarity the problems of multicriteria decision-making and collective choice are somewhat different. Indeed, an improvement in some specifications at the cost of worsen­ ing others is not the same as the satisfaction of interests of some individuals to the prejudice of the rest. In the former case the reciprocal compensations are considered within a certain entirety; in the latter we infringe upon the rights of independent individuals. Moreover, in multicriteria decision-making one usu­ ally takes into account objective factors, whereas in collective choice one has to compare subjective opinions which cannot be measured properly.

Keywords

Arrow'sche Paradoxen Demokratie Diktatur Entscheidungsfindung Gruppenentscheidung Kollektive Entscheidung economics information management planning statistics value-at-risk

Authors and affiliations

  • Andranick S. Tanguiane
    • 1
    • 2
  1. 1.Computing CentreAcademy of Sciences of the USSRMoscowUSSR
  2. 2.Department of Econometrics and StatisticsFernUniversitätHagen 1Germany

Bibliographic information

  • DOI https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-76516-2
  • Copyright Information Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 1991
  • Publisher Name Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
  • eBook Packages Springer Book Archive
  • Print ISBN 978-3-642-76518-6
  • Online ISBN 978-3-642-76516-2
  • Buy this book on publisher's site