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Understanding Strategic Interaction

Essays in Honor of Reinhard Selten

  • Wulf Albers
  • Werner Güth
  • Peter Hammerstein
  • Benny Moldovanu
  • Eric van Damme
Book

Table of contents

  1. Front Matter
    Pages I-IX
  2. Interview with Elisabeth and Reinhard Selten

    1. Wulf Albers, Werner Güth, Peter Hammerstein, Benny Moldovanu, Eric van Damme
      Pages 1-7
  3. On the State of the Art in Game Theory: An Interview with Robert Aumann

    1. Wulf Albers, Werner Güth, Peter Hammerstein, Benny Moldovanu, Eric van Damme
      Pages 8-34
  4. Working with Reinhard Selten Some Recollections on Our Joint Work 1965–88

  5. Introduction and Survey

    1. Werner Güth
      Pages 39-50
  6. Conceptual Ideas in Game Theory

    1. Ken Binmore
      Pages 51-62
    2. Robert Wilson
      Pages 85-99
    3. Eric van Damme
      Pages 100-110
  7. Evolutionary Game Theory

    1. Peter Hammerstein
      Pages 122-127
    2. Jonas Björnerstedt, Martin Dufwenberg, Peter Norman, Jörgen W. Weibull
      Pages 128-148
  8. Applications of Non-Cooperative Game Theory

    1. Matthew Jackson, Ehud Kalai
      Pages 171-184
    2. Thomas Quint, Martin Shubik, Dicky Yan
      Pages 185-197
    3. Eric J. Friedman, Thomas Marschak
      Pages 198-216
    4. Eyal Winter
      Pages 217-227
    5. Werner Güth, Hartmut Kliemt
      Pages 243-256
    6. Werner Güth, Martin Strobel, Bengt-Arne Wickström
      Pages 257-269
  9. Relating Cooperative and Non-Cooperative Game Theory

  10. Principles in Behavioral Economics

  11. Experimental Studies

    1. Ariel Rubinstein, Amos Tversky, Dana Heller
      Pages 394-402
    2. Gary Bornstein, Eyal Winter, Harel Goren
      Pages 418-429
    3. Axel Ostmann, Ulrike Leopold-Wildburger
      Pages 430-443
    4. Joyce Berg, Robert Forsythe, Thomas Rietz
      Pages 444-463
    5. Roy J. Gardner, Jürgen von Hagen
      Pages 464-474
    6. Charles R. Plott, Theodore L. Turocy III
      Pages 475-493
    7. Graham Loomes, Martin Weber
      Pages 494-512
  12. Back Matter
    Pages 513-517

About this book

Introduction

Strategic interaction occurs whenever it depends on others what one finally obtains: on markets, in firms, in politics etc. Game theorists analyse such interaction normatively, using numerous different methods. The rationalistic approach assumes perfect rationality whereas behavioral theories take into account cognitive limitations of human decision makers. In the animal kingdom one usually refers to evolutionary forces when explaining social interaction. The volume contains innovative contributions, surveys of previous work and two interviews which shed new light on these important topics of the research agenda. The contributions come from highly regarded researchers from all over the world who like to express in this way their intellectual inspiration by the Nobel-laureate Reinhard Selten.

Keywords

Entscheidungstheorie Evolution Industrial Economics Spieltheorie behavioral economics boundary element method decision theory economics equilibrium experimental economics experimentelle Wirtschaftsforschung game theory incomplete information non-cooperative game theory strategy

Editors and affiliations

  • Wulf Albers
    • 1
  • Werner Güth
    • 2
  • Peter Hammerstein
    • 3
  • Benny Moldovanu
    • 4
  • Eric van Damme
    • 5
  1. 1.FB Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Institut für Mathematische WirtschaftsforschungUniversität BielefeldBielefeldGermany
  2. 2.Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät, Institut für WirtschaftstheorieHumboldt-Universität zu BerlinBerlinGermany
  3. 3.Abteilung WicklerMax-Planck-Institut für VerhaltensphysiologieSeewiesenGermany
  4. 4.Lehrstuhl für VWL, insb. WirtschaftstheorieUniversität MannheimMannheimGermany
  5. 5.Center for Economic ResearchTilburg UniversityTilburgThe Netherlands

Bibliographic information

  • DOI https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-60495-9
  • Copyright Information Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 1997
  • Publisher Name Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
  • eBook Packages Springer Book Archive
  • Print ISBN 978-3-642-64430-6
  • Online ISBN 978-3-642-60495-9
  • Buy this book on publisher's site