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The Alternating Double Auction Market

A Game Theoretic and Experimental Investigation

  • Abdolkarim Sadrieh

Part of the Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems book series (LNE, volume 466)

Table of contents

  1. Front Matter
    Pages i-vii
  2. Abdolkarim Sadrieh
    Pages 1-5
  3. Abdolkarim Sadrieh
    Pages 6-13
  4. Abdolkarim Sadrieh
    Pages 258-260
  5. Abdolkarim Sadrieh
    Pages 261-264
  6. Abdolkarim Sadrieh
    Pages 265-352

About this book

Introduction

The alternating double auction market institution is presented as a discrete time version of the open outcry market. The game in extensive form is analyzed in an almost perfect information setting, using the concept of subgame perfectness. By applying two new equilibrium selection criteria, a general existence result is obtained for "impatience equilibria" of the game. All such equilibria are shown to have unique properties concerning the traded quantities and prices. The most important results are that the equilibrium prices are independent of the number of traders and are always very close to - if not inside - the range of competitive prices. The latter can be evaluated as game theoretic support for the convergence of prices to the competitive price. The process of price formation is traced by applying the learning direction theory and introducing the "anchor price hypothesis".

Keywords

Analysis Experimental economics Experimentelle Wirtschaftsforschung Spieltheorie auctions game theory simulation

Authors and affiliations

  • Abdolkarim Sadrieh
    • 1
  1. 1.Laboratorium für experimentelle WirtschaftsforschungUniversity of BonnBonnGermany

Bibliographic information

  • DOI https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-58953-9
  • Copyright Information Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 1998
  • Publisher Name Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
  • eBook Packages Springer Book Archive
  • Print ISBN 978-3-540-64895-6
  • Online ISBN 978-3-642-58953-9
  • Series Print ISSN 0075-8442
  • Buy this book on publisher's site