Coalition Formation by Sophisticated Players

  • Amnon Rapoport
  • James P. Kahan
  • Sandra G. Funk
  • Abraham D. Horowitz

Part of the Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems book series (LNE, volume 169)

Table of contents

  1. Front Matter
    Pages N2-VII
  2. Amnon Rapoport, James P. Kahan, Sandra G. Funk, Abraham D. Horowitz
    Pages 1-15
  3. Amnon Rapoport, James P. Kahan, Sandra G. Funk, Abraham D. Horowitz
    Pages 16-33
  4. Amnon Rapoport, James P. Kahan, Sandra G. Funk, Abraham D. Horowitz
    Pages 34-66
  5. Amnon Rapoport, James P. Kahan, Sandra G. Funk, Abraham D. Horowitz
    Pages 67-75
  6. Back Matter
    Pages 76-173

About this book

Introduction

The three major aims of the present study were to (a) test some of the major game-theoretic solutions for n-person games in characteristic function form with data obtained from "rational" players; (b) locate, assess, and explain differences between sophisticated and naive subjects in coalition frequencies and payoff disbursements; and (c) provide a common data base for bargaining process analyses and testing of both present and future models. To this end, five quartets of subjects each partici­ pated in 16 different coalition formation tasks presented as computer-controlled, four-person, characteristic function games with sidepayments. All 20 subjects (a) were relatively mathematically sophisticated, (b) were familiar with the major solution concepts for characteristic function games, (c) could safely assume that their co-players were equally sophisticated and knowledgeable, and (d) possessed a high motivation to maximize reward. The results showed that (a) sophisticated players are less restricted than naive players in coalition choice, (b) their payoffs are less variable and less ~galitarian, (c) these differences between the two populations of sub­ jects increase with the complexity of the game, and (d) for III the four-person, mDstly non-superadditive games played in the present experiment, the bargaining set M~i) accounts more accurately for payoff disbursements than do the competitive bargaining set H~i), the kernel K, and Selten's equal share analysis.

Keywords

Formation Koalition Spieltheorie Verhandlung bargaining calculus communication complexity game theory population research science and technology value-at-risk

Authors and affiliations

  • Amnon Rapoport
    • 1
  • James P. Kahan
    • 2
  • Sandra G. Funk
    • 1
  • Abraham D. Horowitz
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of PsychologyUniversity of North Carolina at Chapel HillChapel HillUSA
  2. 2.Department of PsychologyUniversity of Southern CaliforniaLos AngelesUSA

Bibliographic information

  • DOI https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-48312-7
  • Copyright Information Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 1979
  • Publisher Name Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
  • eBook Packages Springer Book Archive
  • Print ISBN 978-3-540-09249-0
  • Online ISBN 978-3-642-48312-7
  • Series Print ISSN 0075-8442
  • About this book