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Web and Internet Economics

9th International Conference, WINE 2013, Cambridge, MA, USA, December 11-14, 2013, Proceedings

  • Yiling Chen
  • Nicole Immorlica
Conference proceedings WINE 2013

Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 8289)

Table of contents

  1. Front Matter
    PDF
  2. The Asymmetric Matrix Partition Problem
    Noga Alon, Michal Feldman, Iftah Gamzu, Moshe Tennenholtz
    Pages 1-14
  3. Polylogarithmic Supports Are Required for Approximate Well-Supported Nash Equilibria below 2/3
    Yogesh Anbalagan, Sergey Norin, Rahul Savani, Adrian Vetta
    Pages 15-23
  4. The Computational Complexity of Random Serial Dictatorship
    Haris Aziz, Felix Brandt, Markus Brill
    Pages 24-25
  5. Incentives and Efficiency in Uncertain Collaborative Environments
    Yoram Bachrach, Vasilis Syrgkanis, Milan Vojnović
    Pages 26-39
  6. Revenue Maximization with Nonexcludable Goods
    MohammadHossein Bateni, Nima Haghpanah, Balasubramanian Sivan, Morteza Zadimoghaddam
    Pages 40-53
  7. On Lookahead Equilibria in Congestion Games
    Vittorio Bilò, Angelo Fanelli, Luca Moscardelli
    Pages 54-67
  8. Trading Agent Kills Market Information
    Rainer Böhme, Jens Grossklags
    Pages 68-81
  9. Designing Markets for Daily Deals
    Yang Cai, Mohammad Mahdian, Aranyak Mehta, Bo Waggoner
    Pages 82-95
  10. The Exact Computational Complexity of Evolutionarily Stable Strategies
    Vincent Conitzer
    Pages 96-108
  11. The Price of Anarchy of the Proportional Allocation Mechanism Revisited
    José R. Correa, Andreas S. Schulz, Nicolás E. Stier-Moses
    Pages 109-120
  12. Can Credit Increase Revenue?
    Nishanth Dikkala, Éva Tardos
    Pages 121-133
  13. Mechanism Design for Aggregating Energy Consumption and Quality of Service in Speed Scaling Scheduling
    Christoph Dürr, Łukasz Jeż, Óscar C. Vásquez
    Pages 134-145
  14. Valuation Compressions in VCG-Based Combinatorial Auctions
    Paul Dütting, Monika Henzinger, Martin Starnberger
    Pages 146-159
  15. Limits of Efficiency in Sequential Auctions
    Michal Feldman, Brendan Lucier, Vasilis Syrgkanis
    Pages 160-173
  16. Competition in the Presence of Social Networks: How Many Service Providers Maximize Welfare?
    Moran Feldman, Reshef Meir, Moshe Tennenholtz
    Pages 174-187
  17. Resolving Braess’s Paradox in Random Networks
    Dimitris Fotakis, Alexis C. Kaporis, Thanasis Lianeas, Paul G. Spirakis
    Pages 188-201
  18. Truthfulness Flooded Domains and the Power of Verification for Mechanism Design
    Dimitris Fotakis, Emmanouil Zampetakis
    Pages 202-215
  19. A Protocol for Cutting Matroids Like Cakes
    Laurent Gourvès, Jérôme Monnot, Lydia Tlilane
    Pages 216-229
  20. Quantitative Comparative Statics for a Multimarket Paradox
    Tobias Harks, Philipp von Falkenhausen
    Pages 230-231
  21. Price of Anarchy for the N-Player Competitive Cascade Game with Submodular Activation Functions
    Xinran He, David Kempe
    Pages 232-248
  22. Designing Profit Shares in Matching and Coalition Formation Games
    Martin Hoefer, Lisa Wagner
    Pages 249-262
  23. Jealousy Graphs: Structure and Complexity of Decentralized Stable Matching
    Moshe Hoffman, Daniel Moeller, Ramamohan Paturi
    Pages 263-276
  24. Linear Regression as a Non-cooperative Game
    Stratis Ioannidis, Patrick Loiseau
    Pages 277-290
  25. Optimal Allocation for Chunked-Reward Advertising
    Weihao Kong, Jian Li, Tie-Yan Liu, Tao Qin
    Pages 291-304
  26. Bicriteria Online Matching: Maximizing Weight and Cardinality
    Nitish Korula, Vahab S. Mirrokni, Morteza Zadimoghaddam
    Pages 305-318
  27. Mitigating Covert Compromises
    Aron Laszka, Benjamin Johnson, Jens Grossklags
    Pages 319-332
  28. Characterization of Truthful Mechanisms for One-Dimensional Single Facility Location Game with Payments
    Pinyan Lu, Lan Yu
    Pages 333-346
  29. Equilibrium in Combinatorial Public Projects
    Brendan Lucier, Yaron Singer, Vasilis Syrgkanis, Éva Tardos
    Pages 347-360
  30. Exchange Markets: Strategy Meets Supply-Awareness
    Ruta Mehta, Milind Sohoni
    Pages 361-362
  31. A Lemke-Like Algorithm for the Multiclass Network Equilibrium Problem
    Frédéric Meunier, Thomas Pradeau
    Pages 363-376
  32. Near-Optimal and Robust Mechanism Design for Covering Problems with Correlated Players
    Hadi Minooei, Chaitanya Swamy
    Pages 377-390
  33. Bounding the Inefficiency of Altruism through Social Contribution Games
    Mona Rahn, Guido Schäfer
    Pages 391-404
  34. Welfare-Improving Cascades and the Effect of Noisy Reviews
    Nick Arnosti, Daniel Russo
    Pages 405-420
  35. The Complexity of Computing the Random Priority Allocation Matrix
    Daniela Saban, Jay Sethuraman
    Pages 421-421
  36. Vickrey Auctions for Irregular Distributions
    Balasubramanian Sivan, Vasilis Syrgkanis
    Pages 422-435
  37. Strategy-Proof and Efficient Offline Interval Scheduling and Cake Cutting
    Yuan Tian
    Pages 436-437
  38. Back Matter
    PDF

About these proceedings

Introduction

This book constitutes the thoroughly refereed conference proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Web and Internet Economics, WINE 2013, held in Cambridge, MA, USA, in December 2013. The 36 revised full papers were carefully reviewed and selected from 150 submissions and cover research in theoretical computer science, artificial intelligence, and microeconomics.

Keywords

combinatorial auctions computational complexity game theory scheduling social networks

Editors and affiliations

  • Yiling Chen
    • 1
  • Nicole Immorlica
    • 2
  1. 1.Harvard UniversityCambridgeUSA
  2. 2.Microsoft ResearchCambridgeUSA

Bibliographic information

  • DOI https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-45046-4
  • Copyright Information Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013
  • Publisher Name Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
  • eBook Packages Computer Science
  • Print ISBN 978-3-642-45045-7
  • Online ISBN 978-3-642-45046-4
  • Series Print ISSN 0302-9743
  • Series Online ISSN 1611-3349
  • Buy this book on publisher's site