© 2013

Fair Revenue Sharing Mechanisms for Strategic Passenger Airline Alliances


Part of the Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems book series (LNE, volume 668)

Table of contents

  1. Front Matter
    Pages i-xv
  2. Demet Çetiner
    Pages 1-2
  3. Demet Çetiner
    Pages 3-30
  4. Demet Çetiner
    Pages 43-72
  5. Demet Çetiner
    Pages 73-82
  6. Demet Çetiner
    Pages 159-161
  7. Back Matter
    Pages 163-168

About this book


​A major problem arising in airline alliances is to design allocation mechanisms determining how the revenue of a product should be shared among the airlines. The nucleolus is a concept of cooperative game theory that provides solutions for allocating the cost or benefit of a cooperation. This work provides fair revenue proportions for the airline alliances based on the nucleolus, which assumes a centralized decision making system. The proposed mechanism is used as a benchmark to evaluate the fairness of the revenue sharing mechanisms, where the alliance partners behave selfishly. Additionally, a new selfish revenue allocation rule is developed that improves the performance of the existing methods.


Airline Alliance Fairness Game Theory Revenue Management Revenue Sharing

Authors and affiliations

  1. 1.DüsseldorfGermany

About the authors

Demet Çetiner worked as research assistant at the University of
Duisburg-Essen, Germany from 2008-2012. Since 2012 she has worked at the Supply Chain Consulting department of Bayer Technology Services.

Bibliographic information


From the book reviews:

“The book has nine chapters. … the book is well-written, self-contained, and would be of interest to academics working in this area. … it brings together the theoretical (centralized) allocation approach with the heuristics for the decentralized case … .” (Arne K. Strauss, Interfaces, Vol. 44 (5), September–October, 2014)