Table of contents

  1. Front Matter
    Pages i-xv
  2. Demet Çetiner
    Pages 1-2
  3. Demet Çetiner
    Pages 3-30
  4. Demet Çetiner
    Pages 43-72
  5. Demet Çetiner
    Pages 73-82
  6. Demet Çetiner
    Pages 159-161
  7. Back Matter
    Pages 163-168

About this book

Introduction

​A major problem arising in airline alliances is to design allocation mechanisms determining how the revenue of a product should be shared among the airlines. The nucleolus is a concept of cooperative game theory that provides solutions for allocating the cost or benefit of a cooperation. This work provides fair revenue proportions for the airline alliances based on the nucleolus, which assumes a centralized decision making system. The proposed mechanism is used as a benchmark to evaluate the fairness of the revenue sharing mechanisms, where the alliance partners behave selfishly. Additionally, a new selfish revenue allocation rule is developed that improves the performance of the existing methods.

Keywords

Airline Alliance Fairness Game Theory Revenue Management Revenue Sharing

Authors and affiliations

  • Demet Çetiner
    • 1
  1. 1.DüsseldorfGermany

Bibliographic information

  • DOI https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-35822-7
  • Copyright Information Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013
  • Publisher Name Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
  • eBook Packages Business and Economics
  • Print ISBN 978-3-642-35821-0
  • Online ISBN 978-3-642-35822-7
  • Series Print ISSN 0075-8442
  • About this book