Electoral Systems

Paradoxes, Assumptions, and Procedures

  • Dan S. Felsenthal
  • Moshé Machover

Part of the Studies in Choice and Welfare book series (WELFARE)

Table of contents

  1. Front Matter
    Pages i-xii
  2. Representative Electoral Systems Underlying Assumptions and Decision Rules

  3. Paradoxes Afflicting Electoral Procedures and Their Expected Probability

    1. Front Matter
      Pages 17-17
    2. Nicholas R. Miller
      Pages 93-127
    3. Olga Birkmeier, Kai-Friederike Oelbermann, Friedrich Pukelsheim, Matthias Rossi
      Pages 151-171
    4. William V. Gehrlein, Dominique Lepelley
      Pages 173-199
    5. William V. Gehrlein, Dominique Lepelley
      Pages 201-216
    6. T. Nicolaus Tideman, Florenz Plassmann
      Pages 217-251
  4. Theory and Practice: Additional Considerations in Selecting a Voting Procedure

    1. Front Matter
      Pages 253-253
    2. Ken Ritchie, Alessandro Gardini
      Pages 275-303
    3. D. Marc Kilgour, Erica Marshall
      Pages 305-326
    4. Jean-François Laslier
      Pages 327-351

About this book

Introduction

Both theoretical and empirical aspects of single- and multi-winner voting procedures are presented in this collection of papers. Starting from a discussion of the underlying principles of democratic representation, the volume includes a description of a great variety of voting procedures. It lists and illustrates their susceptibility to the main voting paradoxes, assesses (under various models of voters' preferences) the probability of paradoxical outcomes, and discusses the relevance of the theoretical results to the choice of voting system.

Studies in Choice and Welfare is a book series dedicated to the ethical and positive aspects of welfare economics and choice theory. Topics comprise individual choice and preference theory, social choice and voting theory (normative, positive and strategic sides) as well as all aspects of welfare theory (Pareto optimality; welfare criteria; fairness, justice  and equity; externalities; public goods; optimal taxation; incentives in public decision making; cost-benefit analysis, etc.).

Keywords

Electoral Systems Voting Voting Paradox Voting Procedure Voting Systems

Editors and affiliations

  • Dan S. Felsenthal
    • 1
  • Moshé Machover
    • 2
  1. 1., School of Political SciencesUniversity of HaifaHaifaIsrael
  2. 2., Department of PhilosophyKing's College LondonLondonUnited Kingdom

Bibliographic information

  • DOI https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-20441-8
  • Copyright Information Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2012
  • Publisher Name Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
  • eBook Packages Business and Economics
  • Print ISBN 978-3-642-20440-1
  • Online ISBN 978-3-642-20441-8
  • Series Print ISSN 1614-0311
  • About this book