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Table of contents

  1. Front Matter
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  2. When the Players Are Not Expectation Maximizers
    Amos Fiat, Christos Papadimitriou
    Pages 1-14
  3. How Do You Like Your Equilibrium Selection Problems? Hard, or Very Hard?
    Paul W. Goldberg
    Pages 15-17
  4. A Simplex-Like Algorithm for Fisher Markets
    Bharat Adsul, Ch. Sobhan Babu, Jugal Garg, Ruta Mehta, Milind Sohoni
    Pages 18-29
  5. Nash Equilibria in Fisher Market
    Bharat Adsul, Ch. Sobhan Babu, Jugal Garg, Ruta Mehta, Milind Sohoni
    Pages 30-41
  6. Partition Equilibrium Always Exists in Resource Selection Games
    Elliot Anshelevich, Bugra Caskurlu, Ameya Hate
    Pages 42-53
  7. Mixing Time and Stationary Expected Social Welfare of Logit Dynamics
    Vincenzo Auletta, Diodato Ferraioli, Francesco Pasquale, Giuseppe Persiano
    Pages 54-65
  8. Pareto Efficiency and Approximate Pareto Efficiency in Routing and Load Balancing Games
    Yonatan Aumann, Yair Dombb
    Pages 66-77
  9. On Nash-Equilibria of Approximation-Stable Games
    Pranjal Awasthi, Maria-Florina Balcan, Avrim Blum, Or Sheffet, Santosh Vempala
    Pages 78-89
  10. Improved Lower Bounds on the Price of Stability of Undirected Network Design Games
    Vittorio Bilò, Ioannis Caragiannis, Angelo Fanelli, Gianpiero Monaco
    Pages 90-101
  11. On the Rate of Convergence of Fictitious Play
    Felix Brandt, Felix Fischer, Paul Harrenstein
    Pages 102-113
  12. On Learning Algorithms for Nash Equilibria
    Constantinos Daskalakis, Rafael Frongillo, Christos H. Papadimitriou, George Pierrakos, Gregory Valiant
    Pages 114-125
  13. On the Structure of Weakly Acyclic Games
    Alex Fabrikant, Aaron D. Jaggard, Michael Schapira
    Pages 126-137
  14. A Direct Reduction from k-Player to 2-Player Approximate Nash Equilibrium
    Uriel Feige, Inbal Talgam-Cohen
    Pages 138-149
  15. Responsive Lotteries
    Uriel Feige, Moshe Tennenholtz
    Pages 150-161
  16. On the Existence of Optimal Taxes for Network Congestion Games with Heterogeneous Users
    Dimitris Fotakis, George Karakostas, Stavros G. Kolliopoulos
    Pages 162-173
  17. Computing Stable Outcomes in Hedonic Games
    Martin Gairing, Rahul Savani
    Pages 174-185
  18. A Perfect Price Discrimination Market Model with Production, and a (Rational) Convex Program for It
    Gagan Goel, Vijay Vazirani
    Pages 186-197
  19. The Computational Complexity of Trembling Hand Perfection and Other Equilibrium Refinements
    Kristoffer Arnsfelt Hansen, Peter Bro Miltersen, Troels Bjerre Sørensen
    Pages 198-209
  20. Complexity of Safe Strategic Voting
    Noam Hazon, Edith Elkind
    Pages 210-221
  21. Bottleneck Congestion Games with Logarithmic Price of Anarchy
    Rajgopal Kannan, Costas Busch
    Pages 222-233
  22. Single-Parameter Combinatorial Auctions with Partially Public Valuations
    Gagan Goel, Chinmay Karande, Lei Wang
    Pages 234-245
  23. On the Efficiency of Markets with Two-Sided Proportional Allocation Mechanisms
    Volodymyr Kuleshov, Adrian Vetta
    Pages 246-261
  24. Braess’s Paradox for Flows over Time
    Martin Macko, Kate Larson, Ľuboš Steskal
    Pages 262-275
  25. The Price of Anarchy in Network Creation Games Is (Mostly) Constant
    Matúš Mihalák, Jan Christoph Schlegel
    Pages 276-287
  26. Truthful Fair Division
    Elchanan Mossel, Omer Tamuz
    Pages 288-299
  27. No Regret Learning in Oligopolies: Cournot vs. Bertrand
    Uri Nadav, Georgios Piliouras
    Pages 300-311
  28. On the Complexity of Pareto-optimal Nash and Strong Equilibria
    Martin Hoefer, Alexander Skopalik
    Pages 312-322
  29. 2-Player Nash and Nonsymmetric Bargaining Games: Algorithms and Structural Properties
    Vijay V. Vazirani
    Pages 323-334
  30. On the Inefficiency of Equilibria in Linear Bottleneck Congestion Games
    Bart de Keijzer, Guido Schäfer, Orestis A. Telelis
    Pages 335-346
  31. Minimal Subsidies in Expense Sharing Games
    Reshef Meir, Yoram Bachrach, Jeffrey S. Rosenschein
    Pages 347-358
  32. Back Matter
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About these proceedings

Keywords

Braess's paradox Hedonic games Nash equilibrium algorithmic game theory auctions coalition formation congestion games dynamic flows equilibria game theory marketing models price of anarchy routing games selfish routing

Editors and affiliations

  • Spyros Kontogiannis
    • 1
  • Elias Koutsoupias
    • 2
  • Paul G. Spirakis
    • 3
  1. 1.Lecturer, Department of Computer ScienceUniversity of IoanninaIoanninaGreece
  2. 2.Department of Informatics and Telecommunications Panepistimiopolis, IlissiaProfessor, National and Kapodistrian University of AthensAthensGreece
  3. 3.Computer Engineering and Informatics Department (CEID)University of PatrasPatrasGreece

Bibliographic information

  • DOI https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-16170-4
  • Copyright Information Springer-Verlag Heidelberg 2010
  • Publisher Name Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
  • eBook Packages Computer Science
  • Print ISBN 978-3-642-16169-8
  • Online ISBN 978-3-642-16170-4
  • Series Print ISSN 0302-9743
  • Series Online ISSN 1611-3349
  • Buy this book on publisher's site