Power, Freedom, and Voting

  • Matthew Braham
  • Frank Steffen

Table of contents

  1. Front Matter
    Pages i-xiv
  2. František Turnovec, Jacek W. Mercik, Mariusz Mazurkiewicz
    Pages 23-37
  3. Dan S. Felsenthal, Moshé Machover
    Pages 39-55
  4. René van den Brink, Frank Steffen
    Pages 57-81
  5. Cesarino Bertini, Gianfranco Gambarelli, Izabella Stach
    Pages 83-98
  6. Guillermo Owen, Ines Lindner, Bernard Grofman
    Pages 119-138
  7. Friedel Bolle, Yves Breitmoser
    Pages 185-208
  8. Werner Güth, Hartmut Kliemt, Stefan Napel
    Pages 209-226
  9. Steven J. Brams, D. Marc Kilgour
    Pages 227-243
  10. Donald A. Wittman
    Pages 245-258
  11. Tommi Meskanen, Hannu Nurmi
    Pages 289-306
  12. Keith Dowding, Martin van Hees
    Pages 307-323
  13. Marlies Ahlert
    Pages 325-341
  14. Sebastiano Bavetta, Antonio Cognata, Dario Maimone Ansaldo Patti, Pietro Navarra
    Pages 343-363
  15. Luciano Andreozzi
    Pages 365-383
  16. Frederick Guy, Peter Skott
    Pages 385-403
  17. Timo Airaksinen
    Pages 405-419
  18. Manfred J. Holler
    Pages 421-438

About this book


Power, Freedom, and Voting is an interdisciplinary book that presents a comprehensive insight into current research by economists, mathematicians, philosophers and political scientists on three intimately related concepts that are at the heart of theories of democracy and social welfare. The editors have brought together some of the leading scholars in the different fields to create a distinctive volume. Chapters include contributions on foundational and methodological issues in the definition and measurement of power and freedom and empirical studies of power and coalition formation in voting bodies. The volume also contains contributions that make an effort to bridge the gaps between different disciplinary approaches, including one on the importance of Machiavelli’s writing as a reference point for modern political theory, and others on the related concepts of fairness and responsibility. A majority of the chapters make use of game theory.


Coalitions Freedom Machiavelli Social Welfare Voting Theory election game theory inequality instability linear optimization political theory productivity social choice voting welfare

Editors and affiliations

  • Matthew Braham
    • 1
  • Frank Steffen
    • 2
  1. 1.Faculty of PhilosophyUniversity of GroningenGroningenThe Netherlands
  2. 2.The University of Liverpool Management SchoolLiverpoolUK

Bibliographic information

  • DOI
  • Copyright Information Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2008
  • Publisher Name Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
  • eBook Packages Business and Economics
  • Print ISBN 978-3-540-73381-2
  • Online ISBN 978-3-540-73382-9
  • Buy this book on publisher's site