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Agency Theory and Executive Pay

The Remuneration Committee's Dilemma

  • Alexander Pepper

Table of contents

  1. Front Matter
    Pages i-xi
  2. Alexander Pepper
    Pages 15-42
  3. Alexander Pepper
    Pages 43-76
  4. Alexander Pepper
    Pages 77-99
  5. Alexander Pepper
    Pages 101-116
  6. Alexander Pepper
    Pages 117-126
  7. Back Matter
    Pages 127-133

About this book

Introduction

This new book examines the relationship between agency theory and executive pay. It argues that while Jensen and Meckling (1976) were right in their analysis of the agency problem in public corporations they were wrong about the proposed solutions. Drawing on ideas from economics, psychology, sociology and the philosophy of science, the author explains  how standard agency theory has contributed to the problem of executive pay rather than solved it. The book explores why companies should be regarded as real entities not legal fictions, how executive pay in public corporations can be conceptualised as a collective action problem and how behavioural science can help in the design of optimal incentive arrangements. An insightful and revolutionary read for those researching corporate governance, HRM and organisation theory, this useful book offers potential solutions to some of the problems with executive pay and the standard model of agency.

Keywords

Executive reward Reward systems organization theory Senior Executive Pay Executive Compensation collective action problem public corporation

Authors and affiliations

  • Alexander Pepper
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of ManagementLondon School of Economics and Political ScienceLondonUK

Bibliographic information

  • DOI https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-99969-2
  • Copyright Information The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG, part of Springer Nature 2019
  • Publisher Name Palgrave Pivot, Cham
  • eBook Packages Business and Management
  • Print ISBN 978-3-319-99968-5
  • Online ISBN 978-3-319-99969-2
  • Buy this book on publisher's site