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Essays on Wage Bargaining in Dynamic Macroeconomics

  • Oliver Claas
Book

Part of the Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems book series (LNE, volume 689)

Table of contents

About this book

Introduction

This book addresses collective bargaining in an intertemporal monetary macroeconomy of the aggregate supply–aggregate demand (AS–AD) type with overlapping generations of consumers and with a public sector. The results are presented in a unified framework with a commodity market that clears competitively. By analyzing the implications of three variants of collective bargaining – efficient bargaining in a uniform and a segmented labor market and “right-to-manage” wage bargaining – it identifies the quantity of money, price expectations, union power, and union size as the determinants of temporary equilibria. In the three scenarios, it characterizes and compares the temporary equilibria using both analytical and numerical techniques, with an emphasis on allocations, welfare, and efficiency. It also discusses the dynamic evolution under rational expectations and its steady states in nominal and real terms. Lastly, it demonstrates conditions for stability regarding a balanced monetary expansion of the economy.

Keywords

Efficient bargaining Right-to-manage wage bargaining Nash bargaining Segmented labor markets Wage differentiation Union power Perfect-foresight dynamics Balanced monetary paths

Authors and affiliations

  • Oliver Claas
    • 1
  1. 1.Center for Mathematical EconomicsBielefeld UniversityBielefeldGermany

Bibliographic information

  • DOI https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-97828-4
  • Copyright Information Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2019
  • Publisher Name Springer, Cham
  • eBook Packages Economics and Finance
  • Print ISBN 978-3-319-97827-7
  • Online ISBN 978-3-319-97828-4
  • Series Print ISSN 0075-8442
  • Series Online ISSN 2196-9957
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