Dynamic Games for Network Security

  • Xiaofan He
  • Huaiyu Dai

Part of the SpringerBriefs in Electrical and Computer Engineering book series (BRIEFSELECTRIC)

Table of contents

  1. Front Matter
    Pages i-x
  2. Xiaofan He, Huaiyu Dai
    Pages 1-16
  3. Xiaofan He, Huaiyu Dai
    Pages 17-23
  4. Xiaofan He, Huaiyu Dai
    Pages 25-42
  5. Xiaofan He, Huaiyu Dai
    Pages 43-60
  6. Xiaofan He, Huaiyu Dai
    Pages 61-71
  7. Xiaofan He, Huaiyu Dai
    Pages 73-74

About this book


The goal of this SpringerBrief is to collect and systematically present the state-of-the-art in this research field and the underlying game-theoretic and learning tools to the broader audience with general network security and engineering backgrounds. Particularly, the exposition of this book begins with a brief introduction of relevant background knowledge in Chapter 1, followed by a review of existing applications of SG in addressing various dynamic network security problems in Chapter 2.

 A detailed treatment of dynamic security games with information asymmetry is given in Chapters 3–5. Specifically, dynamic security games with extra information that concerns security competitions, where the defender has an informational advantage over the adversary are discussed in Chapter 3.

 The complementary scenarios where the defender lacks information about the adversary is examined in Chapter 4 through the lens of incomplete information SG. Chapter 5 is devoted to the exploration of how to proactively create information asymmetry for the defender’s benefit.

The primary audience for this brief includes network engineers interested in security decision-making in dynamic network security problems. Researchers interested in the state-of-the-art research on stochastic game theory and its applications in network security will be interested in this SpringerBrief as well. Also graduate and undergraduate students interested in obtaining comprehensive information on stochastic game theory and applying it to address relevant research problems can use this SpringerBrief as a study guide. Lastly, concluding remarks and our perspective for future works are presented in Chapter 6.


Game theory Network security Multi-agent reinforcement learning Dynamic security games Information asymmetry Deception Stochastic game post-decision state Markov decision process Bayesian game incomplete information

Authors and affiliations

  • Xiaofan He
    • 1
  • Huaiyu Dai
    • 2
  1. 1.Department of Electrical EngineeringLamar UniversityBeaumontUSA
  2. 2.Department of Electrical and Computer EngineeringNorth Carolina State UniversityRaleighUSA

Bibliographic information

  • DOI
  • Copyright Information The Author(s) 2018
  • Publisher Name Springer, Cham
  • eBook Packages Engineering
  • Print ISBN 978-3-319-75870-1
  • Online ISBN 978-3-319-75871-8
  • Series Print ISSN 2191-8112
  • Series Online ISSN 2191-8120
  • Buy this book on publisher's site