Commonsense Pluralism about Truth

An Empirical Defence

  • Joseph Ulatowski

Table of contents

  1. Front Matter
    Pages i-xxv
  2. Joseph Ulatowski
    Pages 1-28
  3. Joseph Ulatowski
    Pages 29-56
  4. Joseph Ulatowski
    Pages 85-118
  5. Joseph Ulatowski
    Pages 119-132
  6. Back Matter
    Pages 133-140

About this book


Truth is a pervasive feature of ordinary language, deserving of systematic study, and few theorists of truth have endeavoured to chronicle the tousled conceptual terrain forming the non-philosopher’s ordinary view. In this book, the author recasts the philosophical treatment of truth in light of historical and recent work in experimental philosophy. He argues that the commonsense view of truth is deeply fragmented along two axes, across different linguistic discourses and among different demographics, termed in the book as endoxic alethic pluralism. To defend this view, four conclusions must be reached: (1) endoxic alethic pluralism should be compatible with how the everyday person uses truth, (2) the common conception of truth should be derivable from empirical data, (3) this descriptive metaphysical project is one aspect of a normative theory of truth, and (4) endoxic alethic pluralism is at least partially immune to challenges facing the ecological method in experimental philosophy and alethic pluralism. 


Endoxic alethic pluralism Experimental philosophy Metaphysics Ecology Empirical semantics Arne Næss normativity

Authors and affiliations

  • Joseph Ulatowski
    • 1
  1. 1.University of WaikatoHamiltonNew Zealand

Bibliographic information

  • DOI
  • Copyright Information The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2017
  • Publisher Name Palgrave Macmillan, Cham
  • eBook Packages Religion and Philosophy
  • Print ISBN 978-3-319-69464-1
  • Online ISBN 978-3-319-69465-8
  • Buy this book on publisher's site