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Economic Analysis of Contract Law

Incomplete Contracts and Asymmetric Information

  • Sugata Bag

About this book

Introduction

This book examines the main issues arising in economic analysis of contract law with special attention given to the incomplete contracts. It discusses both the main features of contract law as they relate to the problem of economic exchange, and how the relevant legal rules and the institutions can be analysed from an economic perspective. Evaluate the welfare impacts, analyses the effects and the desirability of different breach remedies and examines the optimal incentive structure of party-designed liquidated damages under the different dimensions of informational asymmetry. Overall the book aims to contribute to the legal debate over the adoption of the specific breach remedies when the breach victim’s expectation interest is difficult to assess, and to the debate over courts' reluctance to implement large penalties in the event of breach of contracts.

Keywords

Breach remedies Optimal Contract mechanism design Social welfare theory of contract law economic exchange Principal-Agent paradigm

Authors and affiliations

  • Sugata Bag
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of EconomicsDelhi School of EconomicsDelhiIndia

Bibliographic information

  • DOI https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-65268-9
  • Copyright Information The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2018
  • Publisher Name Palgrave Macmillan, Cham
  • eBook Packages Economics and Finance
  • Print ISBN 978-3-319-65267-2
  • Online ISBN 978-3-319-65268-9
  • Buy this book on publisher's site